# Grapevine – 1NC – Rd. 3

### 1NC

#### Interpretation – economic engagement requires expanding bilateral economic relations

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations - is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

#### This means the plan has to be government-to-government – not private economic engagement

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

**B. Violation – the plan engages with the private oil sector, not the government**

**C. Voting issue –**

**1. limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible**

**2. negative ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations disads and counterplans that test ‘engagement’**

**3. at best they’re effectually topical—they remove a barrier to promote trade which may or may not have an effect of improved bilateral relations—infinite number of internal link chains which have the effect of engagement makes negative preparedness impossible**

### 1NC

#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

**Plan isn’t --- voting issue:**

**Limits --- it functionally narrows the topic because few cases can defend conditioning --- the alternative is hundreds of single import or export cases that explode the Neg’s research burden**

**Ground --- QPQ locks in core generics like soft power and foreign politics DAs, counterplans to add or remove a condition, and critiques of diplomacy**

### 1

#### Debt will narrowly pass—Obama’s leverage is key

Kapur, 9/9 --- TPM’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent

(9/9/2013, Sahil, “Is House GOP Backing Down In Debt Limit Fight?” <http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/house-gop-cantor-memo-debt-ceiling-cr-sequester-immigration.php>)

House Republicans are taming members’ expectations ahead of the debt limit showdown, signaling that they may not be able to extract significant concessions from Democrats.

A Friday memo to GOP members by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) says “the House will act to prevent a default on our obligations before” the mid-October deadline the Obama administration has established. “House Republicans,” he says, “will demand fiscal reforms and pro-growth policies which put us on a path to balance in ten years in exchange for another increase in the debt limit.”

The language is vague — intentionally so, in order to maintain wiggle room for Republicans to avert a disastrous debt default. President Barack Obama has vowed not to pay a ransom to ensure the U.S. can meet its obligations.

If and when they do cave, Republicans will be hard-pressed to show their base they got something in return for raising the debt ceiling. In January, they got Senate Democrats to agree to pass a non-binding budget resolution. This time around, the possibilities for symbolic concessions range from a doomed Senate vote to delay or defund Obamacare or instructions to initiate the process of tax reform.

There are a number of demands rank-and-file Republicans have urged leaders to make which could genuinely complicate the battle, such as dollar-for-dollar spending cuts or unwinding Obamacare. Cantor’s memo mentioned neither. GOP members have also called on leadership not to bring up any debt limit bill that lacks the support of half the conference. Boehner hasn’t committed to this and Cantor didn’t mention it in his memo.

There are several reasons Republicans will have a hard time extracting concessions. Back in January, when Obama held firm and refused to negotiate on the debt limit, Republicans folded and agreed to suspend the debt ceiling without substantial concessions but rather symbolic ones. And due to deep divisions within the conference, House Republicans will face enormous challenges in rounding up 218 votes to pass any conceivable debt limit hike.

The party’s top priority is to cut safety-net programs like Social Security and Medicare. But there’s no internal consensus on what to cut. And Republicans, whose constituents are disproportionately older, have generally refused to vote on entitlement cuts without bipartisan cover from Democrats. In this case Democrats are highly unlikely to give it to them, which complicates their task of passing a debt limit bill.

The Cantor memo makes it all but official that Republicans won’t seek to defund Obamacare in the fiscal battles. The strategy, pushed by conservative activists, to withhold support for keeping the government running after Sept. 30 unless Democrats agree to defund Obamacare. Instead it vows to “hold a series of strategic votes throughout the fall to dismantle, defund, and delay Obamacare.” The memo says Republicans “will continue to pursue the strategy of systematically derailing this train wreck and replacing it with a patient-centered system.”

The GOP’s big stand in the fiscal battles will be to force Obama to accept the lower spending levels ordered by sequestration — automatic spending cuts enacted in 2011 — in a measure to keep the government funded. Here Republicans will refuse to cede and the White House has not suggested it’ll veto a bill that maintains sequester spending levels, although Obama wants to cut a deal to replace the sequester.

“In signing a CR at sequester levels,” Cantor writes, “the President would be endorsing a level of spending that wipes away all the increases he and Congressional Democrats made while they were in charge and returns us to a pre-2008 level of discretionary spending.”

#### Calling in a favor on the plan burns up Obama’s limited leverage with House Republicans—PC is finite

Moore, 9/10 --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor

(Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)>)

Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.

There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.

It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.

There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

#### Entertaining GOP negotiating demands will drag the process out and trigger economic collapse

Lobello, 8/27 --- business editor at TheWeek.com (Carmel, 8/27/2013, “How the looming debt ceiling fight could screw up the U.S. economy; Yup, this is happening — again,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy)>)

Ready for more debt-ceiling drama?

The Treasury Department said Monday it would hit its borrowing limit in mid-October, which means that Congress will need to raise its $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to pay the nation's bills.

The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown.

Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare.

But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock":

Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis. It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post]

Indeed, a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said Matt Phillips at Quartz.

Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around:

[Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg]

This morning, Wolfers had this to say:

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. "The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit," Lew said.

He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy."

**Failure to resolve debt ensures nuclear war and turns all impacts**

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Why is this situation so serious? First, we are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things. That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth. Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too. Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard.

Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy. One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited.

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, **moving toward a world free of** nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 2

#### Neoliberalism forces debt-driven bubbles and speculation which causes economic collapse and turns the case

**Palley**, PhD in economics from Yale, **10** (Thomas, MA in IR from Yale, and a BA from Oxford, “AMERICA’S EXHAUSTED PARADIGM: MACROECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND GREAT RECESSION”, New School Economic Review, Volume 4(1), 2010: 15-43, ZBurdette)

This paper traces the roots of the current financial crisis to a faulty U.S. macroeconomic paradigm. One flaw in this paradigm was the neoliberal growth model adopted after 1980 that relied on debt and asset price inflation to drive demand in place of wage growth. A second flaw was the model of U.S. engagement with the global economy that created a triple economic hemorrhage of spending on imports, manufacturing job losses, and off-shoring of investment. Financial deregulation and financial excess are important parts of the story, but they are not the ultimate cause of the crisis. These developments contributed significantly to the housing bubble but they were a necessary part of the neoliberal model, their function being to fuel demand growth by making ever larger amounts of credit easily available. As the neoliberal model slowly cannibalized itself by undermining income distribution and accumulating debt, the economy needed larger speculative bubbles to grow. The flawed model of global engagement accelerated the cannibalization process, thereby creating need for a huge bubble that only housing could provide. However, when that bubble burst it pulled down the entire economy because of the bubble’s massive dependence on debt. The old postWorld War II growth model based on rising middle-class incomes has been dismantled, while the new neoliberal growth model has imploded. The United States needs a new economic paradigm and a new growth model, but as yet this challenge has received little attention from policymakers or economists.

#### And neoliberal engagement with Latin America causes environmental collapse, poverty, and inequality – moral obligation to prioritize the impacts of Western hypocrisy

**Makwana 6** (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>, ZBurdette)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization

The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this scenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the few, writes Rajesh Makwana.

The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global resource allocation. Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources.

There has been much international attention recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin America and its moral basis is now widely questioned. Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries.

The neoliberal experiment has failed to combat extreme poverty, has exacerbated global inequality, and is hampering international aid and development efforts. This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries.

Introduction

After the Second World War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on their government in the US and Europe. Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and strengthened the welfare state.

Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy.

The policies were most ardently enforced in the US and Europe in the1980s during the Regan–Thatcher–Kohl era. These leaders believed that expanding the free-market and private ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and influence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives.

There is a consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank and WTO), and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from within many UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.

There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty who are most in need of financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere 0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy. (Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.)

Neoliberalism has also been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the income of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including China).

The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic disasters suffered by countries in Latin America and South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the provision of healthcare and education. They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world.

The dramatic economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being demonized by the US. Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger to ‘freedom and the American way of life’, Cuba has been subject to intense US political, economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and the mainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at Venezuela’s president Chavez. This over-reaction by Washington to ‘economic nationalism’ is consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past 150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USA’s main economic objective.

According to Maria Páez Victor:

“Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the region’s most vicious dictators such as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet.”

As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countries are forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank and IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve global business opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model.

So influential are corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered a Global Compact with the United Nations, the world’s foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of economic ideology, it is no coincidence that the assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same assumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy.

However, there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most protected in the world. Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign markets and investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infant industries. Instead economically dominant countries are ‘kicking away the ladder’ to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs.

The US and EU also provide huge subsidies to many sectors of industry. These devastate small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods in international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most ‘capitalist’ countries have increased their levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has increased. The requirement is to ‘do as I say, not as I do’.

Given the tiny proportion of individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the economy and what serves the public good is growing fast. Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the public, and the national sovereignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs.

Below we examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.

Economic Growth

Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty.

Logically, however, a model for continual financial growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each second by profit hungry corporations.

Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty, representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assessments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits of economic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the statistical measures employed.

The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause of the growing inequalities seen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are both likely causes.

Free Trade

Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low, effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development.

With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalism that gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services, increased inequality and caused environmental destruction.

In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generating just 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers to the tune of £30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be.

The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a government’s sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential national services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework.

These examples represent modern free trade which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of national and global governance to further the free trade agenda.

Liberalization

The World Bank, IMF and WTO have been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied by corporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies.

According to neoliberal ideology, in order for international trade to be ‘free’ all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.

Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute financial and economic crisis in many developing countries. At the same time, foreign speculators and large financial firms make huge gains. Market liberalization poses a clear economic risk; hence the EU and US heavily protect their own markets.

A liberalized global market provides corporations with new resources to capitalize and new markets to exploit. Neoliberal dominance over global governance structures has enforced access to these markets. Under WTO agreements, a sovereign country cannot interfere with a corporation’s intentions to trade even if their operations go against domestic environmental and employment guidelines. Those governments that do stand up for their sovereign rights are frequently sued by corporations for loss of profit, and even loss of potential profit. Without this pressure they would have been able to stimulate domestic industry and self sufficiency, thereby reducing poverty. They would then be in a better position to compete in international markets.

#### Vote negative to interrogate the assumptions of the 1AC to create space for alternatives to neoliberal engagement

**Munck**, professor of Globalization and Social Exclusion, **3** (Ronaldo, Department of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Work Studies and Globalisation and Social Exclusion Unit, University of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3, pp 495–511, 2003, <http://www-e.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/Journal%20Library/Trade%20and%20Countries/Neoliberalism,%20necessitarianism%20and%20alternatives%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf>, ZBurdette)

Taking as its point of departure the position that there are or must be alternatives to neoliberalism, this article explores the issue in relation to some examples from Latin America. The 2001–02 virtual collapse of the economy of Argentina and the recent victory of Workers Party candidate, Lula, in Brazil highlight, in very different ways, the need for a viable alternative democratic economic strategy for Latin America. Many progressive analysts seem to be paralysed by a false ‘necessitarianism’ which grants more coherence an d solidity to the neoliberal project than it merits. Argentina puts paid to that illusion. Will the exciting experience of Porto Alegre’s ‘participatory budget’ in Brazil now be scaled up to the national level or does ‘globalisation’ block this option? Do the old questions of imperialism and dependency now come to the fore again after being left dormant under the spell of globalisation? We may not have all the answers yet but Latin America is back in the foreground of thinking and practice around alternative economic theories.

There is no alternative (TINA) was an oft-repeated expression of Margaret Thatcher’s, used to dismiss any plausible alternatives to her brand of hard-nosed neoliberalism. One imagines that her friend General Pinochet, with whom she shared tea during his enforced stay in London, would agree with her. What is more surprising is the influence the TINA philosophy has had on social science analysis of neoliberalism in Latin America since Pinochet. What I propose is a radically anti-necessitarian approach to neoliberalism, inspired by the work of Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Things are not always how they are because they have to be so. There is life beyond neoliberalism. There are alternatives taking shape all the time at all levels of society in Latin America. The so-called Washington Consensus is no longer so consensual even in Washington and there is growing recognition that globalisation requires global governance. We therefore need to return to the rise of neoliberalism and globalisation in a nonnecessitarian spirit and examine the whole horizon of possibilities that is now opening up in Latin America as elsewhere. If the virtual collapse of Argentina in 2001–02 shows that ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism simply does not work even on its own terms, the exciting but also challenging prospects now opening up in Brazil under Lula underline the urgency of developing a credible and viable alternative to its policies.

### 3

Text: The government of the Russian Federation should **provide all necessary aid towards the Venezuelan oil sector.**

#### Russian foreign policy solves the aff

Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, “RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA,” v.1, n.1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)

Aromatic coffee, ripe bananas, fancy orchids, fiery samba, soap operas – this is kind of standard Russian associations, which arise when Latin America is mentioned. And although the peak of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the "flaming continent” was left behind in the 1970’s, the modern Russia is catching up. As a result the Latin American direction has become, perhaps, the most spectacular component of Moscow’s international activities in recent years. Billions of dollars in contracts, joint projects in various spheres, state-of-the art technologies – this is what brings together Russia and Latin American states today. Russia has diplomatic relations with all of the 33 countries in the region, with 18 of them it has agreements based on new cooperative principles – nothing of the kind has ever existed before. Some analysts predict a new "golden age" for Russia -Latin American cooperation. According to Vladimir Davydov, the director of the Institute of Latin America and corresponding member of the RAS, the unprecedented intensity of Russia-Latin American dialogue is due to the fact that Russia’s leaders have realized the strategic importance of Latin America. "For years the initiative was coming from Latin America, the Latin Americans were coming, breaking through with their exports, seeking to raise the level of political contacts. Moscow was reacting… without real inspiration”, noted Davydov. "Fortunately, the situation has changed drastically"2. Nowadays Russia has the concept of its foreign policy, approved on July 12, 2008, which directly reflects Moscow's desire to build up political and economic cooperation with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, expand cooperation with them in the international organizations, promote exports in the region of high-tech industrial products, carry out joint projects in energy, infrastructure, high technologies, including those that make part of the plans, developed by the regional integration associations3.

#### Russia solves – Venezuela’s its largest FDI target

The Maritime Executive 13 – world’s largest international business journal (March 6, 2013, The Maritime Executive, “Russia Sees Venezuela Oil, Arms Shipping Moving Ahead After Death of Chavez”, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Russia-Sees-Venezuela-Oil-Arms-Shipping-Moving-Ahead-After-Death-of-Chavez/, accessed 7-21-13, BH)

Russia expects to continue benefitting from economic ties with Venezuela via billions of dollars in oil and weapons contracts after the death of Hugo Chavez, who led the South American country for 14 years.¶ “A constructive, positive and mutually beneficial agenda will remain a constant for any government, as it will from the Russian side,” President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk today.¶ Putin tapped OAO Rosneft Chief Executive Officer Igor Sechin to lead the Russian delegation to Chavez’s funeral on March 8, Peskov said. Sergey Chemezov, head of Rustech, a government holding company that includes several weapons manufacturers, and Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov will also attend, Peskov said.¶ Since Putin and Chavez first met in 2001, Venezuela has become the most important overseas investment target for Russian oil companies and is on track to become the largest export market for Russian arms after India by 2015, according to Viktor Semyonov and Igor Korotchenko, analysts at the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, respectively.¶ Chavez was an “outstanding leader” and “close friend” of Russia, Putin said in a statement released by the Kremlin. The Venezuelan leader was an “unconventional and strong person who looked to the future and always set the highest standard for himself,” Putin said.¶ ‘Worries Overblown’¶ Rosneft and other Russian oil producers plan to invest $17.6 billion in Venezuela to quadruple their combined output in the country to 930,000 barrels a day by 2019, Venezuela’s oil minister, Rafael Ramirez, said in January. That would be about equal to what Azerbaijan, the third-largest supplier in the former Soviet Union, currently produces.

#### US involvement empowers coalitions against Maduro

Spetalnick ‘13

Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties. "Hugo Chavez was a destabilizing force in Latin America, and an obstacle to progress in the region," said Mike Rogers, a Republican from Michigan and chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives intelligence committee. "I hope his death provides an opportunity for a new chapter in U.S.-Venezuelan relations." "Hopefully there will be a peaceful transition of power in Venezuela with real, meaningful democratic reforms," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat from Florida, said in a message on Twitter. OBAMA'S NOT-SO-SUBTLE MESSAGE Obama called it a "challenging time" for Venezuela and - in a measured but not-so-subtle message to Vice President Nicolas Maduro, Chavez's preferred successor - said the United States "remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for human rights." Taking the chill off the relationship between Washington and Caracas will not be easy. Recent U.S. efforts to improve long-dormant cooperation in areas like drug interdiction and regional security were favourably received at first in Caracas but ultimately failed to yield any real progress, the senior administration official said. And Washington was quick to reject Maduro's accusations, made just hours before his announcement of Chavez's death, that the United States had been engaged in a conspiracy against the president and Venezuela. "Their statements and actions today call into question their interest in having a functional and productive relationship with the United States," the official said. Chavez, who took on Cuban leader Fidel Castro's role as Latin America's most vocal critic of Washington, accused the United States of pursuing imperialist policies in the region as he used Venezuela's oil wealth to bolster leftist allies. As for whether Washington hoped to see Venezuela move away from its alliance with communist-ruled Cuba, the U.S. official said: "That's up to them to determine who their partners are." But the official added that Washington has not hesitated to make known its displeasure when "there were relationships with actors of concern." U.S. officials had contended that Chavez' rule eroded democratic freedoms in Venezuela and he went too far in concentrating power in his own hands. But any overt U.S. effort to intervene in Venezuela's politics now would almost certainly backfire, and possibly harm the anti-Chavez opposition. "It is a delicate time. I think the United States needs to be very patient and not become a factor internally in a way that ... could become negative," said Arturo Valenzuela, the U.S. State Department's top official for the Western Hemisphere from 2009 to 2011.

#### Maduro stands on crossroads – his perceived political success is key to check narco-generals. That causes internal meltdown.

Noriega ‘13

Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – “Venezuela elections may stir things up” ” – InterAmerica Security Watch – April 13th, 2013 – http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/venezuela-elections-may-stir-things-up/

As I noted after Chávez’s death last month, Venezuela is a country on the verge of a socioeconomic meltdown. Street crime, power outages, and shortages of food and consumer goods trouble the lives of millions of citizens. The government is running a dangerous fiscal deficit; mismanaged social programs are unsustainable. State revenues are down dramatically because the state-run oil company – packed with political cronies and plundered by Chávez to fund pet projects – is producing far less oil than it was 15 years ago. The regime has forfeited its legitimacy as senior officials are complicit with drug trafficking and terrorism. And the shameless intervention of Havana to manage the chavista succession has stirred anger among nationalists in Venezuela’s once-proud military. Confronting these challenges without Chávez at the top of the ticket, the regime has exploited every unfair advantage to engineer a convincing victory. Although the chavista leadership has closed ranks around Maduro, their confidence has to have been shaken by his buffoonish performance – claiming to chat with Chávez through a little bird circling over his head, for instance, or clumsily mimicking the antics of his charismatic predecessor. Even if the chavistas decide to steal an electoral victory for Maduro, after the election, the narcogenerals led by National Assembly president and ruling party chief Diosdado Cabello will second-guess Maduro as he tries to run the country. Cabello considers himself a much more able administrator, and he has a bitter distrust of the Cubans who appear to be micromanaging Maduro and his campaign.

#### If Venezuela slips into a narco-state, it turns each case advantage.

Noriega ‘12

Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – TESTIMONY¶ OF¶ AMBASSADOR ROGER F. NORIEGA¶ BEFORE THE¶ UNITED STATES¶ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES¶ COMMITTEE ON¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS¶ SUBCOMMITTEE ON¶ TERRORISM, NON¶ -¶ PROLIFERATION AND TRADE¶ “¶ Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat¶ ”¶ 1:30 PM, Wednesday,¶ March 20¶ , 2012 – http://www.aei.org/files/2013/03/20/-hezbollahs-strategic-shift-a-global-terrorist-threat\_134945797264.pdf

Some may assess this¶ cooperation between¶ “¶ narco¶ s” and¶ terrorist¶ s¶ as a marriage¶ of convenience between different criminal elements or¶ just¶ another¶ modus operandi¶ of¶ powerful international drug syndicates¶ that can be tackled by l¶ aw enforcement¶ . Instead,¶ this criminal activity is the product¶ of a¶ conscious strategy of¶ rogue regimes in¶ Iran and¶ Venezuela to wage¶ asymmetrical warfare¶ against¶ U.S. security, interests and allies¶ close¶ to the homeland¶ .¶ As such, it requires a much more robust analysis and coordinated¶ response¶ –¶ from exposing terrorist g¶ roups working within Venezuela, identifying¶ narcoterrorist activities in Central America,¶ imposing¶ sanctions against state¶ -¶ ru¶ n entities¶ being used to conceal criminal transactions,¶ to dismantl¶ ing transnational money¶ laundering schemes.¶ Under bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in December, the Department of¶ State was given six months to provide you with an analysis of and strategy for dealing¶ with Iran’s activities in the Americas. Until now, the State Department has earned a¶ repu¶ tation within the U.S. government of minimizing this¶ threat¶ . This Subcommittee will¶ have to press the Department to conduct a thorough and rigorous review of the Iranian¶ and Hezbollah activities in our region and to expose the¶ extraordinary¶ role¶ that is¶ p¶ layed¶ by Venezue¶ la in this regard. U.S. diplomats will then have to inform our neighbors about¶ this problem and lay the groundwork for a coordinated strategy for dealing with this¶ phenomenon in our Hemisphere.¶ Mr. Chairman, I fear that these narco¶ terrorist activities will exact an increasingly terrible price from our neighbors and our nation¶ until our national security establishment recognizes the nature of the threat and fashions an effective response.

### 4

#### *The aff engages with a flagrant human rights violator - Moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### 1NC Oil

#### Squo solves – market pressures

**González and Vyas, 13** (4/4/2013, Angel González and Kejal Vyas, “Unlocking Venezuela’s vast energy potential; Revival of the country’s oil sector post-Chávez on standby,” <http://www.businesswithoutborders.com/topics/opportunities/unlocking-venezuelas-vast-energy-potential/>, JMP)

But **declining oil output and rising shale-oil production in the U.S., Venezuela’s main market, may force a redirection.** Barring any new political or military shocks in the Middle East, **global oil prices look like “a balloon with a slow leak**,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, executive director for energy and sustainability at the University of California-Davis. The Venezuelan government can’t count on high oil prices to match rising public spending, she added. Anticapitalist rhetoric heated up in the days leading to Mr. Chávez’s death. Venezuelan Acting President Nicolás Maduro accused Chevron Corp., the No. 2 U.S. oil company by market value behind Exxon, of aggression against Ecuador in a multibillion-dollar environmental lawsuit pitting the company against Ecuadorean plaintiffs. Analysts said they were surprised by the comments, as Chevron, the only major U.S. oil company to remain in Venezuela, was considered by Mr. Chávez as a key investor, and is lending Venezuela $2 billion to increase output at a joint-venture oil development. A spokesman for Chevron declined to comment on Mr. Maduro’s assertion. Despite the posturing, Mr. Chávez’s death presents an opportunity for a new administration to lift some of the burdens heaped on PDVSA, which has supplied billions of dollars in cheap oil to Cuba and other friendly foreign governments, said Carlos Jordá, a Houston-based oil consultant who was once a senior manager at the oil company. To reach its full potential, Venezuela´s entire oil industry sector needs to be reinvented, something that is unlikely, said Luis Pacheco, a former PDVSA executive fired during the oil strike of 2003 along with 20,000 other employees who opposed Mr. Chávez. In 2000, Mr. Chávez signed its first oil deal with Cuba, providing the communist island with 53,000 barrels a day of cut-rate oil, a sum that has risen to 110,000 barrels now. In return, the Cuban government has sent some 40,000 doctors and experts to support the popular social programs developed by Mr. Chávez. Mr. Jordá, who called those oil deals unsustainable, said that domestic fuel prices, the world’s lowest at around 6 cents a gallon, will also have to rise at some point. The cost to the country of the domestic fuel subsidies has also increased because refinery accidents forced the government to import growing quantities of gasoline, according to the EIA. The Venezuelan government denies it imports fuel. **Worsening fiscal conditions will** also **prompt** Mr. **Chávez’s successors to improve relations with foreign investors—and eliminate bottlenecks** created by the deceased leader’s highly-personal, hands-on management style, **said** Jim **Loftis, a partner with Vinson & Elkins LLC’s international arbitration practice**. **The country also needs to increase oil production to pay for tens of billions of dollars in Chinese loans** it undertook to finance large social projects and a big boost in election spending last year. “Venezuelans see their relationship with oil as if the nation’s virility is at stake,” Mr. Pacheco said. Until that perception changes, the oil industry will “keep dancing in a circle around the fire, waiting for it to rain.”

#### Can’t solve – structural issues

**Snow, 13** --- OGJ Washington Editor (3/6/2013, Nick, “Outlook uncertain following Chavez’s death in Venezuela,” <http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/03/outlook-uncertain-following-chavezs-death-in-venezuela.html>, JMP)

PDVSA’s deterioration PDVSA’s internal and managerial capabilities have deteriorated since 2002, according to Sarah A. Ladislaw, co-director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Energy and National Security Program, and CSIS Senior Vice-Pres. Frank A. Verrastro, who holds the James R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy and Geopolitics there. “Increasingly, PDVSA relies on contractors, as well as other private company partners, to keep the fields in production but reports state that contractors have not been paid in months and that the political uncertainty in the country has even driven routine decision making to a halt,” they said in a Mar. 6 commentary. **Sustained political uncertainty also has stifled outside investment in Venezuela’s oil sector,** Ladislaw and Verrastro noted. Russian and Indian companies planning to invest in the country’s oil fields have withheld incremental new money, and China has not announced a new line of credit or extensions on its development-linked financing since last April, they said. In Venezuela, Oil and Mining Minister and PDVSA Pres. Rafael Ramirez said on Mar. 1 that PDVSA plans to increase its expenditures to $25 billion in 2013. Cooperation between PDVSA and Russia’s Rosneft consortium also has been growing, Ramirez said on Jan. 31. **“Even under the best of circumstances, reform in the energy sector will take a long time to emerge,”** Ladislaw and Verrastro said. “**The damage that has been done to not only PDVSA but to the institutions of the state and civil society could take years to rehabilitate.”**

#### Venezuela’s overreliance on oil makes instability and economic collapse inevitable

**GIS 13** (Geopolitical Information Service, May 28, 2013. The Dangers of ‘Dutch Disease’ in Latin America.” <http://www.geopolitical-info.com/en/economics/the-dangers-of-dutch-disease-in-latin-america>)

A number of Latin American economies have boomed as world prices of their export commodities have increased. But **where governments are heavily reliant on one or two commodities and have not prepared for prices to fall, they are at risk of** what has been labelled ‘**Dutch disease’**. **A SIX-fold increase in oil prices** in the last decade **gave Venezuela an unprecedented bonanza** – almost US$1 trillion in revenues. Under the charismatic leadership of President Hugo Chavez (1999-2013), **it propelled Venezuela on to the world stage**. **Now** Mr Chavez is dead, **Venezuelan oil output is declining and energy prices are no longer rising**. Many observers believe **the fate of** the country [**Venezuela**] **is** now **totally linked to the price of oil** and the vagaries of **an extremely volatile market** Venezuela's new leader, Nicolas Maduro, is untested and without charisma. Dutch windfall The case of **Venezuela is an extreme example of** what has become known as **'Dutch disease'**, named after the experience of the Netherlands in the 1960s when new discoveries of natural gas in the North Sea brought sudden and massive increases in export revenues for the Dutch government. The windfall, called ‘rents’ by economists because they are over and above the normal profit on a market exchange, caused the real exchange rate to appreciate and produced powerful disincentives to invest in non-tradeable goods, such as domestic manufacturing and services. The Dutch economy fell out of balance and was plunged into a severe recession. **Venezuela is almost totally reliant on just one commodity** – **oil**. **Revenues from** the sale of **oil** by its national petroleum company, PDVSA, **account for 80 per cent of the** nation’s gross domestic product (**GDP**). In the last decade, the average annual windfall has been 30 per cent of GDP. The wealth accumulated over a decade amounted to 320 per cent of GDP. Oil price legacy **The price of oil is** arguably **the critical variable which determines the stability of** the **Venezuela**n state, its economy and social cohesion. As the price of oil went up in 2010-2011, the government took an increasing portion of the windfall to use for social policies that amounted to buying votes for Mr Chavez. As the price of oil levelled off in 2012-2013 to around US$90 per barrel, the windfall has shrunk and the newly-elected government of President Maduro has had less to spend. Even since his narrow election victory on April 14, 2013, crime has increased and there have been numerous social protests. The government is also having to renegotiate the generous deals on oil it had offered friendly governments, such as Nicaragua and Cuba. Dutch disease The title of an article in The Economist in 1977 about the impact on the Dutch economy of the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea Large foreign exchange earnings from export of the gas led to a shift in prices and in the exchange rate, so that previously competitive exporters lost market share, and production of those exports fell Precipitated economic crisis and plunged the Dutch economy into severe recession It was the second time the Dutch government had experienced the phenomenon - the export of tulips created a commodity bubble in 17th century Holland Failure to deal with the bubble brought the Dutch economy to its knees Economists now use the term 'Dutch disease' to describe a reduction in a country’s export performance as a result of an appreciation of the exchange rate after a natural resource such as oil has been discovered Potential **symptoms of Dutch disease:** Shift in investment to the commodity which further increases a rise in its price and away from previously competitive economic sectors; **rising inflation, economic stagnation and political instability** But Mr Maduro has other problems. Hugo Chavez drained off the income of PDVSA and did not invest in the industry. **Deferred maintenance has shut down the country’s only refinery. Oil production has fallen** and the government has been forced to import refined oil.

#### Fracking makes price shocks inevitable

**Nagel 5/16** (Juan Nagel, Writer for Foreign Policy, May 16, 2013. “Is Venezuela Becoming a Failed State?”http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/16/is\_venezuela\_becoming\_a\_failed\_state)

A [recent report](http://www.ibtimes.com/iea-says-supply-shock-north-american-shale-tar-sands-transforming-global-energy-scene-1257095) by the International Energy Agency underscores the challenges the country faces in the short term. **The United States has made huge progress in oil extraction thanks to fracking technology. It is set to become the world's largest oil producer by the year 2020, and the global spread of fracking is bound to significantly increase international recoverable oil reserves in the near future**. The agency crows that fracking is creating a "supply shock that is sending ripples around the world." **This obviously matters to** Venezuela, **a country that** exports large amounts of oil and little else. Venezuela is increasingly reliant on high oil prices to maintain some semblance of stability. A prolonged drop in oil prices will undoubtedly shake the foundations of the **petro-**state to its core. **Being an oil producer,** Venezuela can earn money in two ways: by sustaining high prices, or by increasing production. (Obviously, if it can do both things, it has hit the jackpot). Fracking threatens the first, and the country has seriously failed on the latter.

#### Turn - U.S. influence causes instability in Latin America – Venezuela and Columbia prove

**Avilés 05** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska (William, “The Democratic-Peace Thesis and U.S. Relations with Colombia and Venezuela,” LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 142, Vol. 32 No. 3, May 2005, http://faculty.unlv.edu/kfernandez/articles/aviles.pdf)//SS

The cases of the Samper and Chávez administrations raise important¶ questions about the nature of relations between democracies. Proponents of¶ the democratic-peace argument view the spread of democracy in Latin¶ America as a welcome change in the international system in that democracies¶ do not war with each other. Less sanguine observers have concluded that they¶ do fight each other in less dramatic ways.¶ The explanations given for various **U.S. interventions into the politics of**¶ **other democracies have stressed the “weakness” and “fragility” of the**¶ **democracies involved and/or pointed to evidence that intervention was**¶ **required to save them. Venezuela and Colombia were cited as models** by different U.S. governments as a democratic alternative to communist revolution¶ or right-wing authoritarianism during the cold war and were viewed as¶ democracies by the U.S. government well into the 1990s. Finally, both countries enjoyed substantial trade relations with the United States, with neoliberal economic reforms only strengthening those relations. Throughout the¶ Samper and Chávez administrations democracy was under assault. In both¶ cases the response of the U.S. government to threats to democratic control¶ was conditioned by their impact upon competing policy objectives such¶ as the maintenance of the drug war**,** the security of transnational capital’s¶ investments, and an oil policy consistent with the interests of transnational¶ corporations.¶ In the case of Venezuela, the United States stood almost alone among the¶ countries in the Western Hemisphere in supporting a military coup against a¶ democratic government. Both before and after the coup it financially supported the actors who directly challenged democratic control. In this case, the¶ OPEC politics of the Chávez administration, its open criticism of the U.S.¶ drug war and antiterrorism policies, and its opposition to neoliberalism all¶ ran counter to U.S. national interests and/or the interests of transnational corporations. In contrast, its support of the coup leader Pedro Carmona, who¶ immediately implemented policies consistent with the neoliberal agenda,¶ suggests that relations based on mutual trust and cooperation are contingent¶ upon similar policies.¶ In the Colombian case, the United States pursued a policy agenda that¶ contributed to destabilizing an elected leader in the hope of achieving gains¶ in the drug war, despite the threat to democratic institutions. However, U.S.¶ pressure stopped short of creating conditions that might have led to the overthrow of Samper because U.S.-based transnational corporations, Colombian¶ economic conglomerates, and representatives of Colombia’s export sector¶ played crucial roles in lessening the effect of U.S. policy.¶ In neither case did the U.S. engage in military intervention or war with¶ these two democracies, but the lack of military conflict between the two¶ states had little to do with shared norms or institutional checks upon executive power. The United States accomplished its goals in the Colombian case;¶ its government intensified the war on drugs while maintaining an economic¶ environment consistent with the needs of capitalist globalization. The future¶ of the Venezuelan case is less clear, because the Chávez administration¶ remains in place. It has not, however, eliminated all foreign investment in¶ Venezuela’s oil industry or made a complete break with neoliberalism. Further radicalization of Venezuela’s government may lead to an escalation of¶ U.S. efforts to isolate it and support a political opposition working for its¶ downfall, whether the country remains democratic or not.

#### Political institutions check escalation

Coll 12 (Alberto R., Professor of International Law – DePaul College of Law, Former Chairman of the Strategic Research Department – U.S. Naval War College, Former Dean – Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, “The Real Latin American Revolution”, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 5-17, http://2012summits.org/commentaries/detail/coll\_2, Deech)

With the G8 gathering in Camp David and the NATO summit in Chicago, it is easy to lose sight of one of the key revolutions in global affairs over the past fifteen years: the rise of Latin America. Until not long ago, Latin America was synonymous with instability, revolution, and economic stagnation. For much of the Cold War, two highly destructive forces dominated Latin American politics. One was the tendency of its powerful militaries to block any progressive reform by installing repressive regimes, many of which went on to commit appalling human rights atrocities in the name of fighting communism. The other was the penchant of Latin America’s elites for protectionism, populism, and revolution as panaceas for the region’s ills. The results were political conflict, massive poverty, and limited clout in global affairs. In the 1970s and 1980s, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina were left behind by the likes of China, India, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, which had been backwaters only a few decades earlier. Today, Latin America is an economically dynamic region with a growing voice in international affairs. Symbolically enough, the June meeting of the G20 group of world economic powers will take place in Mexico, and three Latin American countries—Brazil, Mexico and Argentina—now count among its highly sought-after ranks. Elsewhere, the latest new member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—the mostly European and North American group of democracies committed to a free market economy—is Chile, invited to join in 2010 on the basis of its impressive economic performance and political stability. Several developments help to explain Latin America’s resurgence. The first is political. With notable exceptions such as Venezuela and parts of Central America, political institutions have matured and democratic practices have strengthened. In most countries, the military has retreated from politics, ceding space to a vigorous civil society. There were over thirty military coups in the region between 1975 and 1985. In the past decade there was only one (in Honduras).

#### No cooperation with terrorists

Tegel ‘13

Simeon Tegel is a British journalist based in Peru and is GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America. He writes about a broad range of themes across Latin America – “American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove” – Salon.com – Jan 8, 2013 – http://www.salon.com/2013/01/08/is\_venezuela\_harboring\_hezbollah/

American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove Is Venezuela providing operational support to Islamic terrorists? That deadly serious question is increasingly troubling foreign policy and security experts as the South American country and Iran — which funds Hezbollah — move ever closer. Despite deep cultural differences, a shared antagonism toward the US has drawn Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, into an unlikely political friendship in recent years. “Iran is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity, revolution, strong faith,” Chavez said during one early visit to Tehran. “We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power and Venezuela is becoming one. We want to create a bipolar world. We don’t want a single power [i.e., the US].” Beyond the rhetoric lies a strategic alliance that has seen Caracas, along with Damascus and Havana, vote against United Nations sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, and increasing Iranian investment in the Venezuelan economy, now worth more than $5 billion. All of that is very public. But, according to critics such as veteran US Republican Latin Americanist Roger Noriega, Venezuela is also providing operational support to Hezbollah, the Lebanese-based organization classified as terrorist by the US, UK and other allies. It even came up in November’s US elections, with the Republicans claiming in their official online party platform: “Venezuela has become a narco-terrorist state, turning it into an Iranian outpost in the Western hemisphere.” “The current regime issues Venezuelan passports or visas to thousands of Middle Eastern terrorists offering safe haven to Hezbollah trainers, operatives, recruiters and fundraisers.” The GOP did not respond to GlobalPost’s requests for comment. But its claim was questioned — and even ridiculed — by several security experts in Israel and South America contacted by GlobalPost. “That is exaggerated. Generally, this kind of activity [terrorism] is conducted by small units. It is political rhetoric,” said Ely Karmon, one of Israel’s top independent counter-terrorism experts. Nicholas Watson, a senior analyst at British firm Control Risks, who specializes in South America, agreed, describing it as “unhelpful.” He added: “That kind of rhetoric, the blatant accusations, doesn’t help the US’ position in the region. It actually plays into Chavez’s hands and strengthens him within Venezuela.” That Hezbollah has been active in Latin America is hardly news. Argentine investigators have linked the group to two deadly bombings in Buenos Aires in the 1990s. Together, the attacks on the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center killed 114 people. One of five Iranians wanted by Interpol over the second bombing, Ahmad Vahidi, is now Iran’s defense minister. Last year, he had to make a rapid departure during a state visit to Bolivia when Argentine prosecutors requested Bolivian police arrest him. Meanwhile, according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington, DC, nonprofit research group, there’s growing evidence that Hezbollah is infiltrating other parts of Latin America, taking advantage of widespread corruption and drug trafficking to raise funds for its activities in the Middle East. The Buenos Aires attacks took place years before Chavez, now cancer-stricken but recently re-elected, came to power in Venezuela. He was even in jail, awaiting trial for his role in a failed coup, at the time of the first bombing, on the Israeli embassy. Nevertheless, a jigsaw of data, put together by everyone from Karmon to Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, paints a disturbing picture of apparent bilateral cooperation in areas such as Iran’s outlawed nuclear ambitions and the Venezuelan military’s adoption of Tehran’s defense doctrine of “asymmetrical” warfare; in other words, guerrilla resistance to a potential US invasion. Now canceled, there was also a secretive weekly flight from Caracas to Tehran, with a stopover in Damascus, operated jointly by Iran Air and Conviasa, the state airlines in Iran and Venezuela respectively. Karmon and others say the passengers did not pass through customs. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s Lebanese-born Interior Minister Tareck El Aissami — who was previously in charge of the country’s passport office, fueling the Republican claim of papers being given to Islamic terrorists — makes no secret of his sympathies. “I’m also the son of Arabs, I’m Palestinian, I’m Iraqi, and today we are the resistance force,” he said at a 2009 event in support of Palestinians in Gaza. “There are Hezbollah supporters in the Venezuelan government. They have been neither investigated nor fired. They have been kept in their jobs,” said Roman D. Ortiz, director of Bogota-based security consultancy Decisive Point. But does that translate into the Chavez government arming or providing training facilities or other logistical support to Hezbollah? “The existence of a Lebanese community [in Venezuela] plus a left-wing populist government plus the anti-American rhetoric does not equal terrorism,” says Control Risks’ Watson. “That is speculation.”

#### No nuclear terrorism – **tech** barriers.

Chapman ‘12

(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: **After Sept. 11**, 2001, **we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida** and its ideological kin **have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious**. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “**the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small**.” **The events required** to make that happen **comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist** group **has to get a bomb or fissile material**, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. **If that were easy, one would have already gone missing**. Besides, **those devices are probably no longer a danger,** since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal**.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards** designed to prevent unauthorized use. **As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp**. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. **Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause**. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas**, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.** Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. **This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on**, **multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up**. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. **Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother**. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, **the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.**

#### No lashout

Washington Post ‘7

(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375\_pf.html)

Presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."

### 1NC Russia

#### Russia’s largely benign

Christou 13 – London School of Economics and Political Science with an MSC in International Relations.  (April 21, 2013, “Russia and Venezuela after Chavez” <http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/>)

<But despite this continuation in rhetoric and action, the international context may or may not affect how the relationship continues. [Some claim](http://indrus.in/world/2013/03/06/venezuelan_president_hugo_chavez_dies_at_58_22693.html), Maduro is even more anti-American than his predecessor and arguably Russia and Putin have hardened their stance towards the United States in recent years as the “reset’ in their relationship failed to take off. However, a notable difference arises when one considers the actions of both states towards the US. Russia, despite its quest for great power status has in many cases fallen in line with American foreign policy goals. North Korea is a good example. While Russia has never issued rhetoric as strong as that of the United States, Russian politicians have always stressed Russian desire to mediate in the ongoing disputes arising from North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capability. In fact, in the current impasse which is arising following continued North Korean provocations Russia’s Foreign Ministry essentially [fell in line](http://rt.com/politics/korea-nuclear-moscow-talks-330/) with the US view: “For Russia – which is a member of United Nation’s Security Council – this is completely unacceptable”. Another example where Russia has essentially fallen in line was 9/11, when Vladimir Putin pledged co-operation with the US to defeat terrorism – the link here was obviously Russian desire to justify its own actions against what is saw as domestic terrorism in Chechnya. Obviously, disagreements still exists, and serious ones at that. Syria is a major case in point, with Russia having blocked three Security Council resolutions to date. None-the-less the Russian side has called [for alleviation](http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/02/uk-syria-crisis-idUKBRE9100KS20130202) of the crisis, and in broader terms that even the Americans would be reluctant to intervene in the conflict. But the point is that Russian foreign policy can in many cases correspond with that of the US. Russia won’t always agree with the US but its actions in the foreign policy arena suggest a mindset where domestic considerations will prevail, and even if these don’t correspond with American desires rhetoric will be strong but overly scornful.>

#### And cooperation with Venezuela’s inevitable

AP, 10 - Associated Press (“Chavez: Russia Offers Venezuela Nuclear Help”, Fox News, 4-3-10, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/03/chavez-russia-offers-venezuela-nuclear-help/)//KG>

CARACAS, Venezuela – Russia has agreed to help Venezuela draw up plans for a nuclear power plant, President Hugo Chavez said Friday. Atomic energy was one of many areas of cooperation discussed as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made his first visit to the South American country. "We're ready to start drawing up the first plan of a nuclear power plant, obviously with peaceful aims," Chavez said. Chavez had announced plans to turn to Russia for nuclear help in the past. He did not give details on how much Venezuela is prepared to invest, or how long it might take. Russia and Venezuela also launched a joint business to tap vast oil deposits in eastern Venezuela, and Chavez said Moscow has offered to help Venezuela set up its own space industry including a satellite launch site. Putin also pledged to keep selling arms to Venezuela. Chavez's government has already bought more than $4 billion in Russian weapons since 2005, including helicopters, fighter jets and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles. "We will continue supporting and developing Venezuela's defense capabilities," said Putin, who headed back to Moscow after the one-day visit. He noted Russia has agreed to lend Venezuela up to $2.2 billion for additional arms deals and said Venezuela has yet to use any of those funds. Chavez said the two governments were discussing new arms deals but did not give details. Officials signed 31 agreements during Putin's visit to deepen cooperation in areas from air transport to agriculture. Russia is sending more than 2,000 Lada cars to Venezuela, Chavez said. Putin said there are plans to eventually assemble the cars in Venezuela. Chavez has grown increasingly close to Russia, Iran and China while fiercely criticizing U.S. policies, and his calls for countering U.S. influence to create a "multi-polar world" have found resonance in Moscow. "Our objective is to make the world more democratic, make it balanced and multi-polar," Putin said. "The cooperation between Russia and Venezuela in this context has special importance." When asked by a reporter how the U.S. might view Venezuela's growing defense spending, Chavez noted Washington has barred arms sales to his government. "The Yankee empire doesn't want us to have one single little plane," he said, adding: "We don't really care what Washington thinks. We aren't making alliances here against Washington." Putin said if the United States doesn't want to sell arms to Venezuela, "well, for us that's good." Chavez said Thursday that Russia has offered to help Venezuela set up a "satellite launcher and a factory" to help Venezuela establish its own space industry. He didn't give details or say how much that might cost. Venezuela launched its first communications satellite from China in 2008. The U.S. State Department poked fun at Chavez's suggestion that Venezuela may set up a space industry with Russian help. "We would note that the government of Venezuela was largely closed this week due to energy shortages," spokesman P.J. Crowley told reporters. "To the extent that Venezuela is going to expend resources on behalf of its people, perhaps the focus should be more terrestrial than extraterrestrial." Worsening electricity shortages prompted Chavez's government to decree public holidays throughout this week to save energy. A severe drought has pushed water levels to precarious lows at the dam that supplies most of Venezuela's electricity. Putin said Russia's government sees Venezuela as something of a bridge for deepening ties with Latin America, and noted that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev plans to visit Brazil soon. Bolivian President Evo Morales met in private with Putin at Chavez's presidential palace Friday night. Bolivia is requesting a loan from Russia to buy helicopters to help combat drug trafficking, Morales said. Venezuela's state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA has formed a joint venture with a consortium of five Russian oil companies to drill for and process heavy crude in the Orinoco River basin in eastern Venezuela. The five companies — Rosneft, Lukoil, TNK-BP, Gazprom and Surgutneftegas — have agreed to pay the Venezuelan government $1 billion for the right to help develop an area known as Junin 6, and Putin handed Chavez a folder containing what he said was a $600 million down payment. Venezuela also agreed to allow the companies to be involved in three other areas in the crude-rich Orinoco region. Political analysts in Moscow say Russia is drawn to Venezuela because of the its anti-U.S. rhetoric, though business deals have helped cement the growing relationship. "The only thing that really unites Russia and Venezuela is that they don't want to see a unipolar world," dominated by the U.S., said Sergei Mikheyev, an analyst at the Center for Political Technologies, adding that President Barack Obama's administration hasn't done enough to lure Moscow away from Caracas. But, he said, "Without the business involved, the anti-American rhetoric wouldn't be enough to unite Russia and Venezuela." Chavez presented Putin with the Order of the Liberator — Venezuela's highest honor — and gave him a replica of a sword used by South American independence hero Simon Bolivar — the namesake of Chavez's socialist-inspired "Bolivarian Revolution." Putin kissed the replica sword and said: "Russia from the start has supported Latin America's struggle for independence."

#### But, perceptions of American unilateralism kill relations even if it’s not zero sum

Blank 2011 – (Steven, Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College “Russia’s Second Wind in Latin America”, Perspectives on the Americas A Series of Opinion Pieces by Leading Commentators on the Region August 18 <https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf>)

Indeed, Russian policy is not driven by Latin America’s views, but by classical desires for profit and influence, mainly at the expense of the United States, and a visceral anti-Americanism. Analysts like Fedor Lukyanov, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Leonid Radzhikhovky all attest to the virtually obsessive anti-Americanism that drives much of Russian foreign policy.3 Indeed, powerful people like Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Premier Vladimir Putin’s right-hand man, apparently want to conduct a Latin American policy of anti-Americanism and destabilization regardless of the consequences. Sechin reportedly promoted economic deals and arms sales to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the formation among these three of an alliance as “Moscow considers the formation of such a union a worthy response to U.S. activity in the former Soviet Union and the placement of missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic.”4 Not surprisingly Sechin advised Putin that Moscow should upgrade its relations with these countries in particular, and with Latin America in general.5 As Deputy Prime Minister, Sechin appears to have encouraged Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez to develop a nuclear program and Sechin negotiated the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons to Venezuela. In July 2009 he arranged a deal with Cuba that allowed Russia to conduct deep-water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.6 Whereas in the previous thrust into Latin America, Moscow focused primarily, though not exclusively, on reliable friends like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, to whom it either sold a lot of arms or gave considerable economic and energy assistance, today Moscow fully appreciates Brazil’s dominant position in Latin America, has cemented bilateral and multilateral ties with it through the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) organization, and devotes its primary attention on Brazil, while not neglecting other targets of opportunity. Putin has called Brazil a strategic partner for Russia and cited bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, as well as in nuclear energy, space, metals, biotechnologies and telecommunications.7 Beyond that, Russia has long sought entrée into Brazil’s arms market and it continues to do so vigorously. Whereas earlier Moscow wanted to show Washington that Moscow could play in Latin America too, now Moscow’s broader primary objective is support for Russia’s goal of a multipolar world that constrains U.S. power and forces Washington to heed Moscow’s voice before acting. Thus Russia’s new activity builds upon previous policy statements by leading officials. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Latin America and Russia are natural partners, not because of Latin America’s economic growth, but because of the congruence between Latin governments’ foreign policies and Russia’s support of a multipolar world.8 Similarly Putin also stated that “Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming – we will pay more and more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.”9

#### That causes Russian obstructionism – turns the case

Cohen 2011 – Ph.D., professor of Russian studies at New York University and Professor of Politics Emeritus at Princeton University (Stephen, “Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?” <http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity?page=full>)

An enduring existential reality has been lost in Washington’s post–cold war illusions and the fog of subsequent US wars: the road to American national security still runs through Moscow. Despite the Soviet breakup twenty years ago, only Russia still possesses devices of mass destruction capable of destroying the United States and tempting international terrorists for years to come. Russia also remains the world’s largest territorial country, a crucial Eurasian frontline in the conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations, with a vastly disproportionate share of the planet’s essential resources including oil, natural gas, iron ore, nickel, gold, timber, fertile land and fresh water. In addition, Moscow’s military and diplomatic reach can still thwart, or abet, vital US interests around the globe, from Afghanistan, Iran, China and North Korea to Europe and Latin America. In short, without an expansive cooperative relationship with Russia, there can be no real US national security. And yet, when President Obama took office in January 2009, relations between Washington and Moscow were so bad that some close observers, myself included, characterized them as a new cold war. Almost all cooperation, even decades-long agreements regulating nuclear weapons, had been displaced by increasingly acrimonious conflicts. Indeed, the relationship had led to a military confrontation potentially as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Georgian-Russian War of August 2008 was also a proxy American-Russian war, the Georgian forces having been supplied and trained by Washington. What happened to the “strategic partnership and friendship” between post-Soviet Moscow and Washington promised by leaders on both sides after 1991? For more than a decade, the American political and media establishments have maintained that such a relationship was achieved by President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s but destroyed by the “antidemocratic and neo-imperialist agenda” of Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin in 2000. In reality, the historic opportunity for a post–cold war partnership was lost in Washington, not Moscow, when the Clinton administration, in the early 1990s, adopted an approach based on the false premise that Russia, having “lost” the cold war, could be treated as a defeated nation. (The cold war actually ended through negotiations sometime between 1988 and 1990, well before the end of Soviet Russia in December 1991, as all the leading participants—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bush—agreed.) The result was the Clinton administration’s triumphalist, winner-take-all approach, including an intrusive crusade to dictate Russia’s internal political and economic development; broken strategic promises, most importantly Bush’s assurance to Gorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not expand eastward beyond a reunited Germany; and double-standard policies impinging on Russia (along with sermons) that presumed Moscow no longer had any legitimate security concerns abroad apart from those of the United States, even in its own neighborhood. The backlash came with Putin, but it would have come with any Kremlin leader more self-confident, more sober and less reliant on Washington than was Yeltsin. Nor did Washington’s triumphalism end with Clinton or Yeltsin. Following the events of September 11, 2001, to take the most ramifying example, Putin’s Kremlin gave the George W. Bush administration more assistance in its anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan, including in intelligence and combat, than did any NATO ally. In return, Putin expected the long-denied US-Russian partnership. Instead, the Bush White House soon expanded NATO all the way to Russia’s borders and withdrew unilaterally from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the bedrock of its nuclear security. Those “deceptions” have not been forgotten in Moscow. Now Russia’s political class, alarmed by the deterioration of the country’s essential infrastructures since 1991, is locked in a struggle over the nation’s future—one with profound consequences for its foreign policies. One side, associated with Putin’s handpicked successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, is calling for a “democratic” transformation that would rely on “modernizing alliances with the West.” The other side, which includes ultra-nationalists and neo-Stalinists, insists that only Russia’s traditional state-imposed methods, or “modernization without Westernization,” are possible. As evidence, they point to NATO’s encirclement of Russia and other US “perfidies.” The choice of “modernizing alternatives” will be made in Moscow, not, as US policy-makers once thought, in Washington, but American policy will be a crucial factor. In the centuries-long struggle between reform and reaction in Russia, anti-authoritarian forces have had a political chance only when relations with the West were improving. In this regard, Washington still plays the leading Western role, for better or worse.

**No extinction – Bostrom changed his mind**

**Bostrom 7** (Nick, Oxford Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy & James Martin 21st Century School. "The Future of Humanity," New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, http://www.nickbostrom.com/., AMiles)

Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. There are many possible global catastrophes that would cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States might be an example of a global catastrophe that would be unlikely to result in extinction. A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world's population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. A non-existential disaster causing the breakdown of global civilization is, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, a potentially recoverable setback: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind.

**US Russian war won’t go nuclear—US first strike checks**

**Lieber 6** – Professor of Political Science, Notre Dame (Keir and Daryl G. Press, The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, March/April, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html?mode=print, AG)

Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads. Moscow could try to reduce its vulnerability by finding the money to keep its submarines and mobile missiles dispersed. But that would be only a short-term fix. Russia has already extended the service life of its aging mobile ICBMs, something that it cannot do indefinitely, and its efforts to deploy new strategic weapons continue to flounder. The Russian navy's plan to launch a new class of ballistic missile submarines has fallen far behind schedule. It is now highly likely that not a single new submarine will be operational before 2008, and it is likely that none will be deployed until later. Even as Russia's nuclear forces deteriorate, the United States is improving its ability to track submarines and mobile missiles, further eroding Russian military leaders' confidence in Russia's nuclear deterrent. (As early as 1998, these leaders publicly expressed doubts about the ability of Russia's ballistic missile submarines to evade U.S. detection.) Moreover, Moscow has announced plans to reduce its land-based ICBM force by another 35 percent by 2010; outside experts predict that the actual cuts will slice 50 to 75 percent off the current force, possibly leaving Russia with as few as 150 ICBMs by the end of the decade, down from its 1990 level of almost 1,300 missiles. The more Russia's nuclear arsenal shrinks, the easier it will become for the United States to carry out a first strike. To determine how much the nuclear balance has changed since the Cold War, we ran a computer model of a hypothetical U.S. attack on Russia's nuclear arsenal using the standard unclassified formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. We assigned U.S. nuclear warheads to Russian targets on the basis of two criteria: the most accurate weapons were aimed at the hardest targets, and the fastest-arriving weapons at the Russian forces that can react most quickly. Because Russia is essentially blind to a submarine attack from the Pacific and would have great difficulty detecting the approach of low-flying stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles, we targeted each Russian weapon system with at least one submarine-based warhead or cruise missile. An attack organized in this manner would give Russian leaders virtually no warning. This simple plan is presumably less effective than Washington's actual strategy, which the U.S. government has spent decades perfecting. The real U.S. war plan may call for first targeting Russia's command and control, sabotaging Russia's radar stations, or taking other preemptive measures -- all of which would make the actual U.S. force far more lethal than our model assumes. According to our model, such a simplified surprise attack would have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM. [See Footnote #1] This finding is not based on best-case assumptions or an unrealistic scenario in which U.S. missiles perform perfectly and the warheads hit their targets without fail. Rather, we used standard assumptions to estimate the likely inaccuracy and unreliability of U.S. weapons systems. Moreover, our model indicates that all of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would still be destroyed even if U.S. weapons were 20 percent less accurate than we assumed, or if U.S. weapons were only 70 percent reliable, or if Russian ICBM silos were 50 percent "harder" (more reinforced, and hence more resistant to attack) than we expected. (Of course, the unclassified estimates we used may understate the capabilities of U.S. forces, making an attack even more likely to succeed.)

**No chance of miscalc or accidents—this evidence answers all their arguments and is way better**

**Quinlan 9**—distinguished frmr British defence strategist and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State. (Michael, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, 63-9, AMiles)

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, **is implausible**. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. **Both would be desperately look**ing **for signs** that **the other was ready to** call a **halt.** Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be **at least a substantial possibility** of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesis, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. 11 vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen **extensive improvements** in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But **the** rival and **more logical inference from hundreds of** **events** stretching over sixty years of experience **presents itself once more**: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is **wild hyperbole**, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an **order-of-magnitude increase in caution**. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. **The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.**

#### Alt cause – US missile defense, NATO expansion, Georgian war

McIntyre and Ure, 8 - former Senior Pentagon correspondent for CNN AND CNN Congressional Producer in the Pentagon (Jamie and Laurie, “Expert: Russia-Venezuela military exercises reaction to U.S. moves”, CNN World, 9-25-08, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/25/russia.venezuela/)//KG>

Russia is displaying its military power in America's back yard, sending a convoy of warships to Venezuela for joint naval exercises, the first such deployment since the Cold War. The Kremlin is becoming increasingly cozy with Venezuela, Cuba and other Latin American countries unhappy with the United States, in apparent response to thorny issues such as U.S. missile defense plans in Eastern Europe, NATO's eastern expansion, and U.S. warships dispatched to Georgia. "Some of this is the Russians wanting to get even. They see American warships close to their shore; they're going to put Russian warships close to us," said Russian military expert John Pike of globalsecurity.org. The fleet of ships headed toward the Caribbean includes some of Russia's finest, like the nuclear-powered Peter the Great cruiser and the anti-submarine warship Admiral Chebanenko. Pike said that while these vessels are impressive, they are no match for the American Navy and pose little threat to the United States. "They have obsolete technology. They would simply be no match for American warships in a one-to-one combat," he said. Nonetheless, this deployment adds to the tension created earlier this month when two Russian Tu-160 nuclear long-range bombers arrived in Venezuela, also for military exercises. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a vocal critic of the United States, greeted the Russian pilots with a blunt message for Washington. "Venezuela is not alone! Russia is with us," he said. "They are our strategic partners. The Russian Tu-160 bombers on our land are a warning to the empire of the U.S.A.!" Chavez is increasing Venezuela's ties with Russia. He arrived in Moscow on Thursday for his second trip there in the past two months. Russia, meanwhile, has sold Venezuela more than $4 billion in arms. U.S. Defense Department spokesman Geoff Morrell says the Pentagon is not fazed. "Russia is certainly within its rights to conduct exercises with its allies. What's the old saying? You're sort of known by the company you keep. If they wish to hang out with the Venezuelan navy, that's their business," he said. But Russia knows the United States is watching, and that seems to be the idea, Pike said. "The Russians, sort of from here on out, every couple months are going to come up with some sort of new event, some sort of new exercise, some sort of new provocation to keep us focused on them," he said

### 1NC Solvency

#### Venezuela says No – public statements

**El Universal ‘13**

(El Universal is a major Venezuelan newspaper, headquartered in Caracas with an average daily circulation of about 150,000. – “Maduro: Venezuela will have "zero tolerance" for aggressions of Washington” – July 20th – <http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130720/maduro-venezuela-will-have-zero-tolerance-for-aggressions-of-washingto>)

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on Saturday described as **"terminated"** his government-initiated talks with Barack Obama administration. He stressed he would implement a **"zero tolerance"** policy for "aggressions" on Venezuela.¶ "My policy as president is zero tolerance for gringo aggression against Venezuela. I am not going to stand any verbal aggression against Venezuela, neither political nor diplomatic. Enough is enough! Stay away with your empire. Do not mess any more with Venezuela," said Maduro during a ceremony of military promotions in Cojedes state, central Venezuela.¶ The Venezuelan president also reiterated his rejection and condemnation of the statements issued by Samantha Power, the Washington ambassador nominee to the United Nations, on Venezuela. "When she went to Congress, she went crazy and started to attack Venezuela just like that. She started to say that she is going to the UN to monitor and make clear what the repression on political and civil institutions in Venezuela is, and that she will address the lack of democracy in Venezuela."¶ Maduro mentioned a phone call US Secretary of State John Kerry made to Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua. According to Maduro, the Venezuelan foreign minister warned the US top diplomat that Venezuela will not accept **any pressures** in connection with Caracas' offer to grant asylum to former CIA agent Edward Snowden, who is charged with leaking classified information on espionage programs.

#### That outweighs any aff incentives

Shifter ‘13

Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “A Bolivarian Dream Deferred” – Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013 – http://thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3338

It makes sense for Venezuela to reach out to the United States, but at least in the short term, Maduro will have a tough time holding back on his strident, anti-American rhetoric. For political survival, he needs to prove his Chavista bona fides to the base that brought him to the presidency. Whatever happens abroad, Maduro will be increasingly consumed by Venezuela's staggering problems at home. Chávez left a country devoid of institutions. Instead, he bequeathed cronies like Maduro who has so far been able to fend off criticism from his neighbors but is hardly in a position to lead the kind of broad ideological movement that Chávez was able to cobble together in his glory days.

# Grapevine – 2NC – Rd. 3

## CP

### o/v

#### Solves the case – net benefits are solvency, nieto cred, and the Russia turn:

#### Their ev agrees – only two internal links are oil investment and oil production – Russia’s increasing investment by 18 billion and multiplying Venezuela’s oil output by 4 – sufficient to solve the oil adv.

### AT: Tech

#### Russia solves – studies and new venture prove

Rapoza 7/2/13 – Forbes staff writier for Brazil, Russia, India and China (July 2nd, 2013, Ken, Forbes, “In Venezuela, Russia's Rosneft Quietly Expands Its Reach”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/07/02/in-venezuela-russias-rosneft-quietly-expands-its-reach/, accessed 7-22-13, BH)

Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft , said it signed a deal with Venezuelan state owned oil major PDVSA on Tuesday to explore for fossil fuels off the coast of the oil rich South American nation.¶ The deal was signed in Moscow between Rosneft President Igor Sechin and Venenzuelan Oil Minister and PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez. The agreement between the two state owned oil giants includes joint studies for evaluation of technical and economic viability of offshore gas in Venezuela, gas liquefaction for export and domestic sales and additional joint development of natural gas fields.¶ Rosneft and PDVSA are discussing the possibilities of developing oil and gas projects in the Rio Caribe and Mejillones fields, as well as exploring for hydrocarbons in the Venezuelan part of the Caribbean Basin, Gulf of Venezuela and the Atlantic Coast, Rosneft said in a press release today.¶ Sechin was in Venezuela in May to discuss trade relations. There, he also met with PDVSA’s Ramirez to discuss future collaboration between the historically close countries. While in Venezuela, Sechin signed agreements to create a joint venture to develop heavy oil reserves in Venezuela within the Carabobo-2 project.¶ Rosneft’s stake in that joint venture will amount to 40%, the other 60% will be held by PDVSA subsidiary CVP. The Carabobo-2 project includes blocks Carabobo-2 North and Carabobo-4 West with a total area of 342 square kilometers located in the Orinoco River’s heavy crude belt. Reserves at the blocks are estimated to be 40 billion barrels. Commercial oil production is expected to peak at over 400 thousand barrels per day, Rosneft said.¶ The new Russia-Venezuela joint venture is called PetroVictoria.¶

### 2nc solves investment

#### Russian investment high and increasing – stock control gives them an economic incentive to make Venezuelan oil profitable

Tockman 9 – research associate for the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), (October 15th, 2009, NACLA, “Multipolar Machinations: Chávez Endeavors to 'Sow the Oil' with Russia and China”, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/4870, accessed 7-21-13, BH)

During Hugo Chávez's tour of nine countries across northern Africa, western Asia and Europe in early September, the Venezuelan president orchestrated the signing of a flurry of energy accords. Much ink was spilled over Chávez's agreement to exchange oil for machinery and technology with the West's favorite pariah, Iran. But the most far-reaching commitments Chávez secured on his trip took place in Moscow - a series of accords with Russian oil and gas firms to develop a block of the massive Orinoco belt in northeastern Venezuela, one of the largest oil fields in the world.¶ The main accord is a joint venture between Venezuela's state-owned hydrocarbon company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and a consortium of Russian firms, including Lukoil and Gazprom, to explore for, refine and market the oil from a field in the Orinoco belt known as "Junín 6 Block." The Russian consortium will pay US$600 million to the mixed company, securing 40% control for a span of 25 years, during which time 60% will be held by PDVSA. Russia's Transneft will construct a major transportation system for the delivery of oil extracted from the block. Once operational, the Junín 6 Block is expected to produce more than 400,000 barrels per day.¶ In recent years, Venezuela has been pursuing a "multipolar" strategy in trade and investment, which couples deepened regional integration with the pursuit of new markets and investors. Venezuela's regional engagement principally occurs within the frameworks of the market-based Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the cooperative-solidarity oriented Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (TCP-ALBA). A principal component of the TCP-ALBA is multilateral cooperative energy agreements, PetroCaribe and PetroAndina, which combine Venezuelan investment and technology transfer, low-cost oil and gas purchasing arrangements, and the funding of social programs in participating countries.¶ Russia and China are becoming major players in Venezuela's trade relations. In addition to the aforementioned investment by Russian firms, Russian-Venezuelan trade doubled to US$1.1 billion in 2007, largely due to imports from Russia.

### Int’l fiat

**International fiat good—**

1. **Counter-interpretation—single-country international fiat with a solvency advocate is reciprocal to the plan**
2. **Best policy—tests US desirability—can’t divorce advantages from actor—**resolution is a normative statement and the neg should ask specific questions
3. **Neg ground—checks tiny affs with no agent defense**
4. **Advocacy skills—creates global citizens—we’ll be advocates not policymakers—demanding US action trades-off with calling on other actors**

c/I logical solvency advocate chekcs

### condo

#### Conditionality’s good:

#### 1) Advocacy construction – contradictory worlds force a defense of middle ground specifics – prevents racing to ideological extremes which hurts nuanced advocacy skills. Condo’s key to neg flex.

#### 2) Info processing – skew forces smart coverage decisions and strategic choices – information processing outweighs depth – cultivates rigorous and efficient analytical skills.

#### 3) Logic – the status quo’s a logical option – simulates real-world decision-making which turns their standards and is k2 education.

#### 4) The judge’s a referee – potential abuse not a voter, if we don’t make debate impossible, don’t vote aff – perms, 2NR collapsing, and solvency advocates check. T and DAs make skew inevitable.

c/I 1 cp 1 k solves

### Net benefit

#### The DA turns the case and accesses the only credible internal links:

#### 1) Concessions – undermines Maduro’s legitimacy and empowers the opposition which causes a coup – results in a failed state which turns aff solvency, cuts off oil production, and empowers terrorists.

#### 2) Probability – post-election governments are uniquely unstable – letting Maduro establish a power base stabilizes the state.

#### 3) Threshold – status quo lack of terrorism proves the Venezuela is getting more stable – only a risk undermining Maduro makes it worse – their burden to prove positive engagement is preferable when we control impact uniqueness.

### Trick

#### At worst it’s a solvency question – might not cause instability, but it’d force him to say no so neg on presumption

#### Military elites force him to say no

**Shinkman 13**

Paul – National Security Reporter at U.S. News & World Report – internally quoting Doug Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?” – US News and World Report – April 24th – http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2

[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money."¶ "Most criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez.¶ U.S. officials might try to engage the new Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries.¶ But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian elites.**¶** "Maybe if he were operating in different circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."

#### Venezuela says No – public statements

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### AT: Private talks

#### 1) Not normal means – requires congressional implementation – allows them to spike DAs which kills neg ground and is a voter – changing the agent in the 2AC is the justification for ASPEC.

#### 2) “Substantial” means “not covert” – topicality is a voter for ground and fairness

Words & Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

## Oil

### 2NC – Status Quo Solves

#### The status quo solves the aff –

#### 1) Market pressures force it – dropping oil prices and increasing shale production force oil sector reforms – that’s González and Vyas

#### 2) Chinese foreign investment

**Iwata 13** – (Mari, “Venezuela Secures $4 Billion Funding from China,” Wall Street Journal, 6/6/13, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324798904578528922435217366.html)//SR

Venezuela has secured $4 billion in funds from China to be used for oil field development, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Thursday. The minister didn't give details of the new funding from China, which will add to at least $35 billion of credit Beijing has provided to Venezuela, mostly in return for future oil deliveries. The South American country's state energy company Petroleos de Venezuela SA, or PDVSA, said Wednesday that Venezuela was negotiating a $4 billion credit line from Export-Import Bank of China. Mr. Ramirez was speaking in Tokyo following a trip to Beijing for talks with Exim Bank President Li Ruogu and other officials. Venezuela has also secured a number of financing agreements with its partners, ranging from Russia's Rosneft to U.S. oil major [Chevron](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=CVX) Corp., [CVX -0.06%](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=CVX?mod=inlineTicker) during the past few weeks as it looks for funding for its plans to rapidly boost oil production. The new Chinese funds add to a separate $4 billion loan that PDVSA will receive from the Chinese government to boost oil production at Petrolera Sinovensa, a joint venture in Venezuela's between PDVSA and China National Petroleum Corp. in Venezuela's rich Orinoco heavy oil belt. "We plan to increase output to four million barrels a day by 2014 and six million barrels a day by 2016. Only Asia can absorb these increases," Mr. Ramirez told reporters. Venezuela currently produces about three million barrels a day of crude oil. Mr. Ramirez met Japanese Industry Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and was later due to meet officials of [Inpex](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=1605.TO) Corp. [1605.TO +2.48%](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=1605.TO?mod=inlineTicker) and state-funded Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corp.

#### 3) Maduro will liberalize the energy sector

Daly 12 --- CEO of U.S.-Central Asia Biofuels Ltd (12/19/2012, John, “If Chavez Dies, What Next for U.S. - Venezuelan Energy Relations?” http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/South-America/If-Chavez-Dies-What-Next-for-U.S.-Venezuelan-Energy-Relations.html, JMP)

So, if illness does sideline President Chavez, what might happen?¶ First, given the enormity of the nation’s energy reserves, it is most unlikely that foreign countries, starting with the U.S. will sit on their hands, but instead begin to manoeuvre behind the scenes to find and promote a pliable candidate and administration willing to work with them. As Maduro is largely unknown, in the event of Chavez being incapacitated, it is likely that he will come under enormous foreign pressure, little of which is likely to be made public.¶Washington’s wish list would include two primary elements – an end to Venezuelan radical rhetoric and ties to such states as Cuba and Iran, and increased U.S. access to those oil reserves. In May 2011 the U.S. imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PVDSA), and the country’s fiscal crown jewel. President Chavez has used PVDSA as a cash cow for his social reform plans - between 2004 and 2010 PDVSA contributed $61.4 billion to social development funds. According to PDVSA figures, Venezuela currently has 77.5 billion barrels of oil reserves, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. PDVSA has a production capacity, including its strategic associations and operating agreements, of 4 million barrels per day, the highest production capacity in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Related Article: Mexico to Privatize State Oil Company Pemex?¶ But it is President Chavez’s nationalist approach to the country’s energy assets that is likely to be the first target of foreign governments in a post-Chavez Venezuela. In February 2007 President Chavez announced a new decree to nationalize the last remaining oil production sites that were under foreign majority company control, to take effect on 1 May, allowing the foreign companies to negotiate the nationalization terms. Under the new regulations, the earlier joint ventures, involving ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Statoil, ConocoPhillips and BP, were transformed to give PDVSA a minimum 60 percent stake. The process completed a government initiative begun in 2005, when the Chavez administration transformed earlier “operating agreements” in Venezuela’s older oil fields into joint ventures with a wide variety of foreign companies. Thirty out of 32 such operating agreements were transformed, with only two being challenged in court. Most foreign companies accepted the new arrangements, including Chevron, Statoil, Total and BP, but America’s ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused. It therefore seems likely that a new Maduro administration would hear about compensation issues during any first meeting with the U.S. ambassador.¶ Given relative inefficiency and capital starved nature of PDVSA for major expansion projects, calls to loosen up the country’s energy sector may be hard for Maduro to resist.

#### **4) Other Foreign Investment**

AVN 6-14-13 (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, “Venezuela to Increase Oil Production to 3.25m BPD in 2013,” Press-Venezuelan Embassy to the US, http://venezuela-us.org/2013/06/14/venezuela-to-increase-oil-production-to-3-25m-bpd-in-2013/)

Venezuelan Oil and Mining Minister Rafael Ramirez said Thursday that according to projections, the production capacity of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) will reach 3.25 million barrels per day by late 2013.¶ In statements to the media, he said that this is an increase of 250,000 barrels over the previous year, and is thanks to new developments in the Orinoco Oil Belt, the site of the world’s largest certified oil reserves.¶ Ramirez referred to efforts that are under way to increase oil output levels.¶ “1,000 wells are being drilled annually, with 200 drills, hundreds of miles of pipeline are being installed to build in this period of government [2013-2019] a capability that will double the current one,” he said, to reach 6 million barrels per day in 2019.¶ “We are focused on meeting our goals because it is a stage of volumetric expansion of the production capacity, which is in compliance with the timelines stipulated for the [Orinoco Oil] Belt,” he said.¶ Ramirez said that the government has implemented efforts in recent weeks to meet the projected goals for oil extraction and has signed cooperation agreements with strategic partners and secured financing.¶ Last month, PDVSA and Chevron signed a $2 billion line of credit to increase production at Petroboscan from 107,000 barrels to 127,000 barrels per day.¶ Also, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) initialed an agreement with PDVSA for $4 billion to increase production at Petrosinovensa from 140,000 to 160,000 barrels per day by the end of this year.¶ “The disbursement of this funding will be paid by the end of the year, the resources will come in this year,” Ramirez said.¶ The French and American company Schlumberger also signed a cooperation agreement with PDVSA that involves increasing service provision related to oil exploration and production. Meanwhile, Russia’s Rosnieft and PDVSA created a new joint venture called PetroVictoria and agreed to a loan of $1.5 billion.¶ Venezuela is set to increase oil production capacity by 2014, according to the government. The world’s largest crude oil reserves are found in the country, estimated at around 297,700million barrels.

#### **5) China**

Simon 4-29-13 (François, “China in Venezuela: loans for oil,” The Dragon’s Tail, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/2013/04/29/china-in-venezuela-loans-for-oil/)

Indeed, China is Venezuela’s biggest creditor. Venezuela’s difficult economic situation (growth of 6%, high inflation at 20%, budget deficit at 20%, growing public debt at 50% of GDP in 2012) means that it cannot easily borrow from global capital markets to pay for Chavez’ expensive social programs. Beijing and Caracas established a Joint Investment Fund in 2007 with an initial investment of $4 billion by China and $2 billion by Venezuela later boosted to a total of $12 billion in 2009. This fund is mainly used for investment in infrastructure, energy and agricultural projects. A study of Latin America funding by China in 2012 by Trufts University confirms another advantage of Chinese lending over the West as seen in Algeria: banks do not impose any policy condition on borrowing governments and generally have low environmental guidelines. These “tied loans” do however require equipment purchase and oil sales. For example the China Development Bank lent $500 million to PDVSA to buy machinery and equipment for oil drilling with contracts mostly awarded to Chinese-owned companies. Thereby, China serves as an alternative to international banks for financing with low rate loans, while securing access to Venezuela’s oil at a fixed low price and creating business opportunities. Beijing has lent $46,5 billion since 2008, which represents over half of the loans the country has received (95% are loans-for-oil). Thus Venezuela is becoming oil-debt dependent which is naturally a great advantage for Chinese state-owned companies in trade deal and contract negotiations.¶ In the Chavez era, China has invested heavily in raw material. First and foremost in oil: China imports about 10% of its global oil imports from Venezuela – 600 000 barrels per day in 2013 aiming to reach 1 000 000/day in 2015. Of these, 270 000 barrels/day are to repay debts, for a price sometimes as low as $5/barrel according to wikileaks. Chinese state-owned companies have also been awarded many prospecting, drilling and refining contracts offshore and especially in the vast Orinoco belt. Sinopec and CNPC both have established joint ventures to exploit reserves and build refineries in the Junin area while CITIC (China Internatioal Trust and Investment Corporation) and Sinohydro agreed to build condominiums in the Junin and Carabobo areas. China has also invested heavily in Venezuelan mining. Aside from contracts to build industrial condominiums and 33 000 homes in the belt, CITIC has also been awarded a joint ventures in 2012 to explore the Las Cristinas gold and copper mine in Bolivar state, which is one the world’s most important gold reserves. Chavez nationalised the gold industry in 2011, in effect expropriating Canadian “Crystallex” from the mine, who is still at the moment seeking compensation with the help of the World Bank. This is a good example of the shift from Western to Chinese investors and especially to CITIC which is one of Venezuela’s Chinese creditors. Furthermore, like with PDVSA, Venezuela’s stade-owned mining company CVG (Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana) agreed in 2010 with WISCO (Wuhan Iron and Steel Corp – China’s 3rd steel company) on fixing long-term iron ore under the market prices compared to other South American competitors (such as Brazil’s Vale). This shows China’s ability to negotiate cheaper raw material and secure new important contracts after years of domination by the US and other Western powers.

### 2NC – Dutch Disease

Over reliance on oil crushes the Venezuelan economy - that’s GIS

1) Price Shocks - Overreliance on the export of oil makes 94 percent of government revenue subject to price fluctuations—that causes economic collapse and social instability in the short term which turns the advantage

2) Empirics—US subsidized the Venezuelan oil sector in 1980 and when prices declined a decade later the economy collapsed and the country fell to revolution diversification

#### 3) Innovation – collapse forces it – solves the economy *better*

**Moscona-Skolnik 13** (Jacob, “A New Doctrine for Sustainable Development: Case Study in Venezuela”, Harvard International Review, 6/12, http://hir.harvard.edu/blog/jacob-moscona-skolnik/a-new-doctrine-for-sustainable-development-case-study-in-venezuela)//mm

The International Energy Agency avers that the international community must not use more than 1/3 of confirmed oil deposits by 2050 if we are to achieve the goal of preventing in increase in global temperature of more than 2°C. **Is it fair to require Venezuela**—or any Venezuelan government campaigning for popular support—**to limit this crucial sector of its economy** in order to follow international standards? Should it be the responsibility of oil-exporting or oil-importing countries to limit the global oil market? At what point is Venezuela no longer developing “within planetary boundaries” and at what point does the threat of environmental impact trump each individual country’s right to economic and social betterment? **The death of Hugo Chavez represents a turning point in Venezuela and an opportunity for Maduro and others to reevaluate and refocus**. Yet the most practical or even the most moral path is not obvious. Venezuela itself contributes only 0.56% of the world’s total carbon emissions; although, per capita, Venezuela emits more than most other developing countries, this figure pales in comparison to the global North and the already developed countries that neglected environmental and global concerns on their paths to industrialization, urbanization, and development. The SDSN report also nobly calls upon high-income countries to provide both economic and technological aid for still-developing regions. While the dissemination of technology and information is crucial, it must be coupled with technological advances and the use of existing green technologies in the global North (despite potential short term losses). **In the case of Venezuelan oil,** these **measures might** reduce global demand for oil, **spur**ring **homegrown innovation in Venezuela and necessary reform to the economic structure. These steps could revitalize the weakened private sector that, following Chavez’s nationalization of many industries, is reluctant to invest in new technologies or unexplored sectors of the economy**.

#### 4) Other sectors – oil trades off with them – key to *sustainable* growth

**Rossi 11** (Carlos A. Rossi, International Association for Energy Economics, “Oil Wealth and the Resource Curse in Venezuela.” www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=137‎)

Dutch Disease is a complex economics phenomenon that occurs to mineral rich nations when a sudden burst in the demand for its product is recorded. It has been widely analyzed and documented from various sources. Here we will only describe the elements that explain why the oil wealth rent that has accrued to Venezuela has come with a double edge sword that has **contributed to moving** the country into a renter and unproductive society. 1. It has overvalued the national currency and weak**ened the** competitive edge in the production of other staple goods that used to be made and now are imported. 2. Since oil related activities are much more lucrative, this has caused many entrepreneurs to abandon their traditional areas in the rural sectors in favor of flocking to the urban cities in search of a piece of the “oil pie’’. For example, in the 1970’s, a government decision was made to cancel all agricultural related debt in the hopes of eliminating this financial burden and increasing agricultural production. The result was the opposite. Most landowners simply sold or closed their latifundios and moved into the construction business or other urbanite ventures. 3. Massive internal migrations and foreign immigrations to the urban core of principal cities were caused, creating the infamous poverty belts, collapsing all social services and resulting in rampant crime. Venezuela’s population tripled since the first oil boom in 1973. 4. Lavish spending on huge industrial projects that were ill conceived and badly managed were induced, wasting valuable resources, creating the need for permanent subsidies and international debt. Rampant rent seeking and corruption by both state ‘technocrats’ and private contractors occurred. In 1949 Venezuela’s GDP per-capita income was higher than West Germany, Italy and Japan. Now it ranks number 44 in the world. 5. It made the nation more dependent on one commodity for hard currency earnings to pay for imports, which include both final food and medical goods, as well as in parts and inputs for industrial plants. 6. It made the country totally dependent on the Government for all economic activity, including both public and private production since it is the state that controls foreign currency for imports of spare parts and finished goods. 7. It has transformed the political conditions of the country. This last effect is probably the least understood. As opposed to virtually all other developing countries, where the means of production (land, capital, companies) is privately held, Venezuela is different for two reasons: 1) Because, by the constitution oil belongs to the state and 2) because it is a full grown democracy. This means that the vote from the poor people count, and since the country has a lot more poor folk that rich, they count a lot. Hugo Chavez champions the poor people because he not only comes from within their ranks but has developed a great rapport with them. He has improved their lot and hastened their hope and dignity but he has done it charitably, not productively nor sustainably. The phenomena arises since by Venezuelan law whomever governs the state also governs the fate of the countries lucrative oil reserves. This dramatically hastens rent seeking but in the reverse. It is not the rich who have control of the lucrative means of production and the poor who want access to it, but just the opposite. The real paradox in Venezuela is that it is the rich who want access to what the poor (or some) have; the power over the oil wealth. It is a political-sociological pyramid turned on its head. Today oil accounts for over 95% of Venezuela’s exports, 50% of government revenues and 30% of GDP directly. According to official figures, imports tripled between 2000 and 2008 to the unheard of level of US$ 49.4 billion, before they collapsed 22.3% the following year due to policy instigated recessions6. Venezuela’s populist president, Hugo Chavez, has presided over untold oil wealth and a recognizable reduction in Venezuela’s worst poverty levels (through ‘missions’ geared towards extreme hunger alleviation by handouts, free education and health care) has also presided over a collapse in the production of all of Venezuela’s agriculture and much of the industrial apparatus, including crude oil production and even some energy intensive sectors like steel and aluminium. In contrast to other socialist nations that focus on socialist distribution while leaving production issues to private enterprise, Venezuela has opted for the ill defined “productive socialism’’ were the state interferes with basic production decisions of key industries. This socialist production model has exacerbated rent seeking and Dutch disease, and the constant “expropriations’’ have scared off would be investors in virtually all economic sectors. It is not that his socialist production model is not working, but that it can’t work; it is socially-physically impossible for it to work (100 years of productive capitalism is enough time to teach us how companies must be managed to produce.

5) Their UQ is a doublebind – either

A) Instability is increasing because of low energy prices – proves the turn

B) The status quo solves the aff – vote neg on presumption

6) The fracking argument is uniqueness to the turn—a shift to US domestic fracking is inevitable in the short term which will collapse Venezuelan prices and destroy their economy, that turns the advantage before they can solve and means diversification is the only strategy that solves—that’s the Nagel evidence

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#### 7) Only risk of the turn – Venezuela’s economy is growing

**El Universal 13** – (“Venezuela’s GDP Up 0.7% In The First Quarter”, El Universal, 5/31, http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/130531/venezuelas-gdp-up-07-in-the-first-quarter)//mm

The Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) reported on Friday that the gross domestic product climbed 0.7% in the first quarter of 2013, compared to the same period last year. The bank attributed the result to the increases of 2.0% and 0.3% in the gross value added (GVA) of the public and private sectors, respectively. "With the rise in GDP at the beginning of year, we have recorded 10 consecutive quarters of growth in the productive activity," the bank said in a statement. Some of the causes behind the behavior of the economic activity in the first quarter are the strengthening of social policies and the expansion of general government services. Other factors include the slowdown in the growth rate of aggregate domestic demand; reduced imports of intermediate and final goods, given the adjustment of the foreign exchange amidst a complex domestic and international environment and a lower number of working days in the quarter. The BCV said economic growth in the first three months of the year was determined by a 0.9% growth in the value added of the non-oil sector and the oil sector, compared to the same period last year.

### 2NC – AT: Nuclear terror

#### No nuclear terror – tech barriers and no incentive – acquiring scientists, capital, and uranium is transparent – they’ll be caught or fail – that’s Chapman. Empirics prove no threshold to nuclear acquisition or use and it just doesn’t make sense – Iran wouldn’t give away its only nuke in the face of a nuclear Israel.

#### And no incentive to use nukes – goals

Kapur 8

(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact be­have rationally, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too de­structive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga­nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home­land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter­productive for the terrorists in this scenario.

#### This is a double bind – either no retaliation which takes out their impact or WMD attacks not key – conventional terror is inevitable, the aff doesn’t solve that, so lashout is inevitable.

#### They’d use conventional weapons – empirics prove no miscalc

Mueller 8

John Mueller, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1 <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF>

Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005).

#### Obama policies and the nuclear taboo check **retaliation – that’s Washington Post – high level statements and empirics prove no threshold for a sufficiently large terror attack and retaliation doesn’t go nuclear – Iraq war proves.**

## Russia

### 2nc Russia rels uq

#### Relations high now – new cooperation and multilateralism

Englund 5/10/13 – Washington Post Staff (Will Englund, “U.S., Russia finding room to talk”, May 10, 2013, <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-10/world/39158618_1_foreign-minister-sergei-lavrov-russia-chemical-weapons>)

Even as the chill in relations between the United States and Russia continues, the two countries are at least talking to each other more these days. With Secretary of State John F. Kerry and FBI director Robert Mueller both having come here this week for substantive discussions, Russian officials seem to have borrowed a talking point from the Obama administration: Although no one is actually using the word “reset,” the Kremlin is nonetheless promoting the idea that Russia and the United States can pursue productive cooperation where their interests coincide and agree to disagree on other matters. How far-reaching that cooperation might prove to be is an open question. A State Department official praised Russia’s help with “logistics” in arranging for FBI agents investigating the Boston bombings to make inquiries here. But when it comes to the substance of intelligence sharing, both sides remain wary. On Syria, likewise, Kerry’s visit ended with a pledge by the United States and Russia to sponsor a new peace conference, within the month. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said American and Russian intelligence agencies will coordinate their efforts in trying to determine whether chemical weapons have been used in Syria — and by whom. But even as the countries seem to be trying to feel their way toward a resolution of the Syrian crisis — the U.S. ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, took part in the Moscow talks — they still fundamentally disagree on the legitimacy of the Syrian government. Still, Kerry’s visit here Tuesday and Wednesday, which included meetings with Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin, was well-received by his hosts. Russia and the United States have certain common interests on which the two countries can and should work together, Lavrov said afterwards — including not only anti-terrorism efforts, but initiatives against drug trafficking and organized crime. “Secretary Kerry’s visit underscored that 2013 has the potential to produce a more productive trajectory in our bilateral relations,” U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul wrote on his blog. For the past 17 months, ever since Putin began his presidential election campaign, he has been casting the United States as a patron of disorder in Russia and a threat to Russian security. Relations with Washington steadily deteriorated, as each country banned a handful of officials from the other, American adoptions of Russian orphans were barred and American aid across a spectrum of causes was rejected. Russia repeatedly blocked efforts by the United States and other countries to commit the United Nations to resolving the conflict in Syria. Both sides trace the marked change in tone to April 15, when Tom Donilon, President Obama’s security adviser, handed a letter from his boss to Putin, suggesting ways to put the relationship back on course. The Kremlin quickly promised to reply in kind. On that same day, a few hours later, the two bombs went off in Boston. When the connection to the troubles in Russia’s North Caucasus became apparent, the security services of both countries had a compelling reason to open lines of communication, at the very least. Yet all this is happening just as the Russian government itself appears to be going through a potentially serious transition, in a direction that is not at all clear. Vladislav Surkov, a deputy prime minister and once Putin’s chief ideological adviser, was forced out of his job Wednesday in what is widely seen as the most serious move so far by Putin against his onetime protege, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Putin, who has steadily betrayed a lack of respect for Medvedev since early this year, castigated Medvedev’s cabinet the day before Surkov’s resignation for its inability to get things done. Surkov, back when he was in favor, coined the idea of “sovereign democracy” as a description of Putin’s system of control from the top down. But his standing fell during last year’s political protests, and he has most recently been in a public dispute with the country’s chief criminal investigator over allegations of corruption at a new high-tech center called Skolkovo — one of Medvedev’s pet projects. Surkov’s exit illuminates public splits within the Russian ruling circle that until recently would never have been brought to light. The government announced Thursday that he is being replaced by Sergei Prikhodko, who for 16 years was the chief foreign policy adviser in the Kremlin. Some opposition leaders, who in the past castigated Surkov as a propagandist, worried nevertheless that his ouster may be a sign that hard-liners — from the military, police and Federal Security Service — have won the upper hand. At Thursday’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, Putin could be seen conferring and smiling with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, standing by the president’s right hand on the Kremlin reviewing stand, while Medvedev, to the left, stood slightly apart and in silence. Mikhail Prokhorov, the oligarch and Brooklyn Nets owner who ran for president last year, blogged that it was the “end of the era of sovereign democracy.” Kerry, who was here to discuss areas where the two countries can work together, was careful to strike a balance. He met on Tuesday with World War II veterans preparing for the 68th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, and he laid a wreath by the eternal flame that burns just outside the Kremlin wall. But he also met Wednesday with representatives of civil society organizations at Spaso House, the U.S. ambassador’s residence.

### 2NC – V – Russia Coop Inevitable

#### Can’t solve --- Russian military coop with Cuba

Blank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” <https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf>, JMP)

Furthermore, Chávez has sought to engage Moscow not just in a formal alliance, which it has so far resisted, but also in participation in the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribean (ALBA). Medvedev has indicated Russia’s willingness to discuss participation in this organization, since it accords with Russia’s ideas about a multipolar world and international division of labor. 84 Neither has Moscow forgotten about its military partnership with Cuba. Russia has pledged to continue military-technological cooperation (arms sales) with Cuba.85 Russian officials continue to say Cuba holds a key role in Russian foreign policy and that Russia considers it a permanent partner in Latin America.86

#### Aff can’t solve – Russia and Venezuelan cooperation is multifaceted and both are determined to challenge the US

Kroth, 12 - Pravda journalist (Olivia, “Venezuela’s partnership with Russia : An emblematic step”, Voltairenet, 7-16-12, <http://www.voltairenet.org/article174988.html)//KG>

Under President Chávez, Venezuela is enjoying good relations with Russia as one of its most important trade and military partners in Latin America. By strengthening the Venezuelan-Russian ties, Hugo Chávez wants to help creating a multi-polar world, “a world that permits the rights of peoples to liberty, self-determination and sovereignty”. Over the past years, while the Russian Federation has been led by Vladimir Putin either as Prime Minister or as President, the ties between Chávez and Putin have become stronger. Both leaders are ardent patriots, proud to serve their respective countries which they love with great intensity. Both men share similar views on many topics, for example the role of the USA in global economics. Hugo Chávez agreed with Vladimir Putin’s opinion that the USA is an “economic parasite” because of its “constant instability and high debts, living far beyond its means and transferring the burden of its problems to the entire world economy.” On Venezuelan television (VTV) President Chávez repeated Vladimir Putin’s words, demanding Venezuela to “free itself from the parasite”. Venezuela has the largest oil reserves and is the fifth biggest oil exporter world-wide. In the twelve years of Hugo Chávez’ government, Venezuela transferred its international funds from US banks to other banks in different parts of the world. Furthermore Venezuela paid back all of its debts to US banks and ended its dependence on the IMF. Venezuela is a strategic business partner for Russia in the exploitation of gas and crude oil. Since 2005, Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA and the Russian oil company Lukoil have been drilling oil in the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt together. Another joint venture contract was signed in 2011 between Russia’s Rosneft and PDVSA to exploit the oil reserves of the blocs Carabobo-2 North and East. Rosneft holds 40 percent, PDVSA owns the majority of 60 percent. Since 2008, PDVSA has furthermore been drilling gas jointly with Russia’s Gazprom in the Gulf of Venezuela. The Caribbean Gas Belt, which stretches along the coast of Venezuela, contains 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. President Chávez wants his country to produce its own gas with Russian help, thanks to the transfer of Russian technology and training. “It is a great advantage for Venezuela to count on Russia’s presence and Gazprom in the Gulf”, Hugo Chávez pointed out. Another shared Venezuelan-Russian enterprise is the mining of gold in Venezuela’s gold mines, Las Cristinas and Las Brisas. Both gold deposits were nationalized under the Chávez Government. The Russian firm Rusoro was granted partnership with Venezuelan state mining companies. To finance these projects, a bi-national bank was created in 2009. Russia’s Gazprombank and VTB control 51 percent, Venezuela’s PDVSA and the National Treasury own 49 percent. The bi-national bank’s headquarters are located in Moscow, with offices established in Caracas and Beijing. The bi-national bank aims to boost financial cooperation between Venezuela and Russia. According to President Chávez, this bank is a step on the way “to transform the financial architecture of the 21st century”. As Russia’s President Vladimir Putin remarked, the commercial exchange between Russia and Venezuela saw “a tenfold increase in 2011”. Russia exports busses to Venezuela, while the Russian car company Lada is looking to open up factories in Venezuela. The Latin American partner sends agricultural products to Russia: cacao, flowers and plantains (bananas). Ruso-Venezolana Orquídea S.A., a mixed Russian-Venezuelan enterprise for the export/import of Venezuelan orchids to Russia, is building a special cargo terminal in the airport of Caracas-Maiquetía (IAIM), in the state of Vargas. Ricardo Javier Sánchez, director of the enterprise, recently presented the construction project with special installations to keep the orchids beautiful and fresh while being packed and transported all the way to Russia, their final destination. In addition, Venezuela’s socialist agricultural Mission, Gran Misión AgroVenezuela, wants to export more homegrown tropical fruits to Russia: mangos, melons, pineapples. Coffee export shall also be boosted in the coming years. At the beginning of June this year, a Russian delegation, presided by Denis Manturov, Russia’s Minister of Industry and Commerce, visited Venezuela and inspected the site of Fuerte Tiuna in Caracas, where sixteen new apartment buildings were erected with Russian assistance. Each apartment measures between 60 and 70 square meters, comprising two or three rooms, bathroom and kitchen. Venezuela built 10.000 new homes with Russian materials and technology, 6.000 in Fuerte Tiuna, a barrio of the capital city, another 4.000 in Turmerito, a quarter of Turmero, in the state of Aragua. Of course, Russian-Venezuelan arms deals are the main theme of western mainstream press reports, but in reality they are only one of many areas of cooperation. “We want peace”, Hugo Chávez assures, “but in order to preserve the security and tranquility of our nation it is necessary to strengthen our defense”. In view of the alleged ending for the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the endangered socialist Syrian Arab Republic, his words acquire a special meaning. They might sound exaggerated in NATO ears but are well understood in non-aligned countries. Professor Franz J. T. Lee, who teaches political science at the University of the Andes in Mérida/Venezuela, wrote in his essay The Gaddafi paradigm and our dim chance of surviving against global fascism: “Among the grievous errors of the government of Libya are the following: if you are swimming in an ocean of oil and fresh water, you must know that no matter how you try to escape, in the end the Orwellian bloody NATO army boots will come for you. Hence prepare yourself for the coming struggle.” [1] President Hugo Chávez heard the message and is preparing himself for the coming struggle by stepping up the military training and equipment of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, mainly with Russian armament imports. In another article Franz J. T. Lee asked, “Could Venezuela see her future in the oily crystal ball in Libya?” “Nothing more than the fact of possessing the largest oil reserves of the earth, as is the case in Venezuela, can lead to belligerent invasions. Therefore, watch out, Venezuela!” [2] President Chávez seems to foresee danger for himself in the oily crystal ball in Libya. He repeatedly expressed his fears of meeting the same fate as the Jamahiriya’s Great Brother Leader Muammar Gaddafi. “We see that imperialism has dropped its mask, has put aside morals and found a pretext to bomb Libyan towns, killing Libyan civilians”, Hugo Chávez stated in an interview, adding that the imperialists placed him in the same category as Gaddafi, depicting him as a “cruel dictator”. One of Venezuela’s leading intellectuals, Luis Britto García, the author of more than 70 books, explained the situation of the Jamahiriya in a poetic way, interpreting Libyan proverbs in his essay When you see Libya burning (Cuando veas arder Libia): “A Libyan proverb says, ‘Watch out for the malignance of the one to whom you give favors’. The first condition a country has to fulfill in order to be invaded is to possess crude oil and gas reserves. – ‘When cattle dies, the knives are taken out’, admonishes another Libyan proverb. The second condition for a country to be invaded is to exercise sovereignty over its natural resources.” [3] Indeed, the parallels to Venezuela are striking, only a blind person would be unable to see them. President Chávez certainly does not suffer from blindness and is taking precautions. As early as September 2008, Russia sent Tupolev TU-160 bombers for training flights to Venezuela. In November 2008, both countries held joint naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea. The Russian flotilla, including the nuclear-powered warship “Peter the Great”, was dispatched from Russia’s arctic base in Severomorsk. The Russian Federation sells various kinds of weapons and military equipment to Venezuela, including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, attack helicopters, combat aircraft, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled howitzers, self-propelled mortars, assault rifles, sniper rifles, ammunition. According to The Voice of Russia, the latest Russian armament shipment reached Puerto Cabello, Venezuela’s overseas port, in May this year, carrying tanks of the types BTR-80A and BMP-3M, multiple rocket launchers “Smerch” and anti-aircraft missiles S-300V. The Venezuelan Government also received various kinds of ammunition and training simulators. A Russian state official, Sergei Goreslavski, confirmed that the Russian Federation is constructing a maintenance center for military equipment in Venezuela, specialized on repairing helicopters of the types Mi-17B5, Mi-26T2 and Mi-35M2. Meanwhile, Venezuela is not merely an importer any more, but has started producing its own armament and military equipment with Russian help. The country produces two types of “Catatumbo” rifles with Russian design. The first type is modeled after the famous Russian assault rifle Kalashnikov AK-103, designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in 1994 and manufactured by Izmash in Russia. The Venezuelan Army uses the standard issue of this weapon which is now manufactured in the state of Maracuy. The aim is to produce 50.000 units per year. The Venezuelan assault rifle has a caliber of 7.62x39 mm, the same as AK-103. It has a range of 400 meters and can be used with or without telescope, General Morales of the Venezuelan Armed Forces informed. The second type is modeled after the Russian Dragunov rifle, designed by Yevgeny Dragunov between 1958 and 1963, manufactured by Izmash in Russia as well. The “Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova” (SVD) is a semi-automatic sniper rifle, designed as a squad support weapon. The Venezuelan equivalent has a caliber of 7.62x51 mm, an effective range of 800 meters and a maximum range of 1300 meters with telescope. The series of rifles, made in Venezuela, is named “Catatumbo”, after a river that flows into Lake Maracaibo in the state of Zulia. “Catatumbo” lightning occurs over the marshlands at the Maracaibo mouth of the Catatumbo river during storms at night. The very strong light can be seen up to 400 kilometers away and has been used for ship navigation. It was therefore also called the “Maracaibo Beacon”. The beacon of the Venezuelan Armed Forces is its series of “Catatumbo” rifles. The newest feat which President Chávez proudly presented a few days ago is Venezuela’s fist unarmed drone, built with joint Russian – Iranian – Chinese technology and assistance. “It is one of three aircraft that we have made, and we will continue to manufacture them”, he announced. The drone has a range of 100 kilometers, can reach an altitude of 3000 meters and stay aloft for up to 90 minutes. It transmits real-time video and images. The 3x4 meter drone is part of Venezuela’s defense system, aimed at the monitoring of dams, pipelines and other infrastructure. Venezuela has begun to sell weapons and military vehicles to other Latin American countries within the alliances of ALBA and UNASUR. Julio Morales Prieto, director of Cavim (Companía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares), where the Venezuelan drone is built, says that other Latin American states want to buy the drone. During a meeting on the 9th of June, when the Russian delegation visited the Miraflores Palace in Caracas, President Chávez said that “Venezuela has the right to defend itself. We have the constitutional obligation to keep our Armed Forces well equipped, well trained and in high spirits morally for national defense.” On Venezuelan TV the President remarked that the Venezuelan-Russian meeting was a “signal of both governments’ political will to continue strengthening bilateral relations and with these to contribute to a balanced world”. In the cultural area, Russian-Venezuelan cooperation has been intensified as well. The Russian language is taught in national education centers of Venezuela, supervised by the Agency of Cooperation with Russia. These centers organize activities to introduce Russian culture and history in Venezuela, for example with exhibitions, seminars and workshops. Thus, on the 15th of April 2012, a Russian Music Festival was inaugurated in the Art Center Daniel Suárez of Caracas. Tatiana Rusakova, a Russian specialist in Venezuela, pointed out that interest in the Russian culture is growing. “This is due to the fact that Russian-Venezuelan ties have been intensified during the last ten years. In 2011, a group of Venezuelan students visited a number of Russian cities with the program Simón Bolívar 2007-2013.” Tatiana Rusakova also emphasized that more and more Venezuelans are enrolling in Russian language courses. The Central University of Venezuela in Caracas trains future teachers of the Russian language. The Government of the Russian Federation offers scholarships to Venezuelan students who are interested in studying at Russian universities. Last but not least, Venezuela is promoting tourism in Russia. In March 2012, the Bolivarian Government participated in Moscow’s International Tourism Fair (MITT). A group of the Venezuelan Ministry of Tourism (Mintur) presented touristic points of interest in Venezuela to Russian travel agencies. The ten people of the delegation attended more than 190 meetings with international travel agents from Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia, handing out brochures and promotional videos of Venezuela. They also met with officials of tourist magazines: TTG, Voyage, Travel Magazine, News Outdoor, and the internet portal travel.rian.ru. President Chávez promotes cooperation with Russia in other Latin American countries, just like the Russian Federation greeted the recent founding of CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), launched in Caracas, in December 2011. A spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry lauded “this emblematic step that our Latin American partners have made”. Russia supports the desire of Latin American countries for unity and the consolidation of their identity, of which Hugo Chávez is the first and foremost representative.

#### Plan doesn’t solve --- Russia is trying to secure deals with lots of Latin American countries

Blank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” <https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf>, JMP)

To support this economic and strategic agenda, Moscow has made extensive economic overtures to Latin American governments from Mexico to Argentina and Chile. Russia has offered them all deals with respect to oil, gas, nuclear energy, uranium, electricity, weapons sales, high-tech defense technology, agriculture and space launches. Indeed, Medvedev’s trip and talks with local leaders appear to have focused principally on economic issues. 47 Nonetheless, certain patterns are clear. For example, Russia fully understands Brazil’s importance as South America’s largest economy and power and seeks much closer economic ties with it. Since at least 2006, Moscow has been pursuing what it calls a “technological alliance” with Brazil, allegedly because together they can initiate world-class technological projects.48 Russia also wants to take part in a projected gas pipeline from Argentina to Bolivia, as well as other key energy projects with Venezuela and other states.49 One important reason why Moscow included countries like Brazil and Peru is to expand its “commercial beachhead” in South America beyond traditionally anti-American governments and compete more vigorously with the United States, both commercially and politically.50

### 2nc ov

#### The DA outweighs and turns the case:

#### US re-focus to Latin America crowds out Russian foreign policy maneuvering – creates a perception of obstructionism which kills relations.

#### That kills cooperation on nuclear terror – ensures state support for terrorism – Russia sells terrorists nuclear weapons which ensures attacks, escalation, and draw-in – that goes global.

#### Perception of loss of participation ensures nationalism

Nodia 9 – Georgian political analyst who served as the Minister of Education and Science in the Cabinet of Georgia (April 2009, Ghia, “THE WOUNDS OF LOST EMPIRE”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, Iss. 2; pg. 34, Proquest)

I believe that the crucial factor in explaining the peculiarity of the Russian case (or, to use the Churchillian words, the "key" to the Russian "enigma") has to do with developments in **Russian nationalism**, or the Russian **perception** of the world and Russia's place in it. The concept of nationalism mostly brings to mind small nations striving for independence from larger ones. But big-nation nationalism is no less important, even if many contemporary analysts of international relations fail to gauge its significance. Small-nation nationalism is typically about sovereignty, about being recognized as a player that can make its own choices. But great-power nationalism is about **participation in determining the world order**, about having a voice in setting international norms. It is about the recognition not merely of sovereignty, but of greatness. Failure to attain such recognition leads to deep feelings of resentment: It is the note of resentment that makes this variety of nationalism the most powerful factor in international politics, especially post-Cold War politics. The syndrome is mostly characteristic of nations that once had, but have now lost, great-power status. Russia is one of the most conspicuous cases of great-power resentment, though certainly not the only one. Such resentment expresses itself in various ways in the behavior of nations as different as France, Turkey, Iran, and China. The Mainspring of Policy The most popular target of such resentment is the United States-not necessarily because it has done something wrong (it may have done so, of course, but that is not at issue here) but because it is the great power of the day. The resentment may also take as its target a vaguer entity called "the West," because in the modern world, "the West" has acquired the collective moral power to set norms in politics and much more besides.

#### Nationalism resurgence causes nuclear conflict

Israelyan 98 Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly 1998 Winter"

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12

# Grapevine – 1NR – Rd. 3

## 1NC AT LA Instability---No Impact

### No impact—instability will cause reforms, not military conflict

Perez-Linan, prof @ Pitt, 7 [Aníbal Pérez-Liñán is associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, “Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America,” http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521178495&ss=fro]

The 1990s were an era of great hopes for Latin America. After the demise of authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and the early 1990s, major economic reforms were undertaken in most Latin American countries in order to reduce chronic inflation and promote sustained growth. For many contemporary observers, the confluence of democracy and free markets signaled a break with the past, the dawn of a new era of civil liberties, prosperity, and political stability. More than a decade later, it is hard to look back at this period without a mixture of nostalgia and sarcasm. The legacies of the 1990s varied from country to country, but they can be generally described as notable achievements overshadowed by missed opportunities. In the economic realm, hyperinflation was eventually defeated, but economic growth remained elusive and poverty resilient. In the political arena, the military eventually withdrew from politics (not a minor feat), but elected governments, surprisingly, continued to collapse. Starting in the early 1990s, presidents were removed from office in Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia – in some countries recurrently. This outcome frequently represented the triumph of an indignant society over a corrupt or abusive executive, but it seldom prevented the occurrence of new abuses in later administrations. By the early years of the twenty-first century, it was clear that the particular circumstances of each crisis represented only parts of a broader puzzle – a new pattern of political instability emerging in the region. This book explores the origins and the consequences of this novel pattern of instability, emphasizing the critical events that defined the new trend between 1992 and 2004. During this period, civilian elites realized that traditional military coups had become for the most part unfeasible and experimented with the use of constitutional instruments to remove unpopular presidents from office. Presidential impeachment thus became a distinctive mark of the new political landscape in Latin America. The recurrence of presidential crises without democratic breakdown challenged many dominant views among political scientists. Latin American democracies proved to be simultaneously enduring and unstable, willing to punish presidential corruption but unable to prevent it, and responsive to popular demands only in the context of massive protests and widespread frustration. My attempts to understand these facts initially relied on well-delimited theoretical perspectives that proved rather disappointing, and I was forced to embark on a long exploration across the disciplinary boundaries of political sociology, communication, political behavior, institutional analysis, democratization, and the study of social movements. Others who have studied these topics more thoroughly than I may be reluctant to recognize their subject in the chapters that follow, but I hope that they will forgive my intrusion. In the course of this exploration I have wandered through the academic fields of many colleagues and collected a large number of intellectual debts along the way.

## 2NC AT LA Instability---XT No Impact

### No impact—instability causes reforms—military coups are too unstable and fail—economic crises of the 90s prove—that’s Perez

### Bolivia proves

Watson Institute 4 [The Watson Institute for International Studies @ Brown University, Reported by Peng Wu, Watson Student Reporter "Democratization in Latin America: New Trends and Perspectives' http://watsoninstitute.org/events\_detail.cfm?id=488]

\*Cites René Mayorga, Cogut Visiting Professor in Latin American Studies and a political scientist at the Bolivian Center of Multidisciplinary Studies (CEBEM) in La Paz.

René Mayorga discussed Bolivia's struggle to reconcile the two challenges common to young democracies: economic growth and political stability. Since the late 1990s, Bolivia has seen a decrease in economic growth and increase in unemployment, which has begun to erode the country's political stability. The ruling political parties are in decline, and there is an increase demand in the country for more regional autonomy. In a survey taken six years ago, 60 percent of those surveyed stated that political parties are not necessary for democracy. Mayorga is uncertain of what the decline of parties will mean exactly for Bolivia in the long term, but he sees no threat of a possible military coup in the near future.

### No war

Gratius 7 [Susanne Gratius is an expert in Latin America with a PhD in Political Science by the University of Hamburg and a senior researcher at FRIDE, a European think tank for public policy, “Brazil in the Americas: a regional peace broker?,” 1/4/07 http://www.fride.org/publication/223/brazil-in-the-americas:-a-regional-peace-broker]

Brazil is a key partner of Bolivia. PETROBRAS is the main buyer of and investor in Bolivian gas and a significant Brazilian community lives on the Bolivian frontier. In the past years, Brazil has defined itself as the principal external mediator in Bolivian internal political affairs. It negotiated in 2003, together with Argentina, the removal of the president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, and the peaceful solution of the conflict between government and opposition during the subsequent administration of Carlos Mesa. Brazil was also the key actor in the recent ‘ gas conflict’ in Bolivia. 60 The nationalisation of Bolivian gas, announced by President Evo Morales on 1 May 2006 caused bilateral tension. Given its close relation with Bolivia and solidarity with the ‘ Bolivian Revolution’ , 61 the Lula Administration decided to resolve the conflict by means of dialogue, and not pressure, in an attempt to ‘ preserve a strategic relation with the country’ . 62 Concessions made by both parties allowed for the signing of bilateral agreements on the production, distribution and the price of Bolivian gas exports (to Brazil). Brazilian conciliatory actions with regards to the crisis with Bolivia showed that cooperation prevailed over the use of power, 63even with a clear threat (the seizing of PETROBRAS facilities) by the Morales government. Despite the gas conflict, Brazil still maintains close ties with the Morales government, which proclaimed in the January 2007MERCOSUR Summit a desire to join the bloc. The petition was clearly supported by Brazil due to its conviction that integration (and the search for political consensus) offers a framework for political moderation and negotiation, among other reasons. The same logic is applied with regard to relations with Venezuela.

## 1NC AT LA Instability---Resilient/No War

### Stability is resilient

LA Monitor 9 [Latin America Monitor, “Sabres Rattling, But Military Conflict Unlikely” Nov 09 http://www.latinamericamonitor.com/file/84433/sabres-rattling-but-military-conflict-unlikely.html]

BMI View: Tensions between Venezuela and Colombia remain heightened, due to the formers' belligerent rhetoric and recent destruction of bridges straddling the border. Although the risks of a confrontation have risen, we maintain the view that outright military conflict is improbable, given underlying economic interdependencies and likely mediation efforts by other regional powers. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has shown few signs of wanting to defuse tensions with neighbouring Colombia, suggesting that relations will remain frosty for some time to come. On November 26 the Venezuelan armed forces threatened to blow up six more footbridges two where destroyed last week which it alleges are being used for the 'illegal smuggling of gasoline, food and drugs'. This announcement came only a day after a plea by Venezuela's Ambassador to the United Nations that the international organisation should review Colombia's decision to allow US military bases on its soil. Nevertheless, while the heat between the two neighbours may rise further, we remain of the view that outright military conflict is unlikely, as neither side stands to gain anything from an escalation in hostility. To be sure, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has maintained his calm in the face of Chávez's provocations, and last week ruled out any retaliation for Venezuela's bridge-destruction spree. Like Caracas, Bogota has announced a rise in troop deployment along the 2000-km long border, but this in all probability a symbolic reaction rather than a sign of a preparation for war. Needless to say, a key reason why a clash would cause mutual harm is the strong economic interdependency between the two countries they are respectively each other's second largest trading partners after the US. Colombia has already been hard hit by Venezuela's trade embargo which has depressed the formers' exports significantly and will therefore no doubt be very keen to seek a resolution in the near future. Moreover, although Chávez may be hoping to shore up his weakening approval ratings by stirring patriotic sentiment, he is likely to be cognisant of the formidable risks involved of taking things further. As we have underlined previously, the asymmetry between the two countries' militaries according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies Colombia's military eclipses Venezuela's by a factor of two means that there is a veritable physical deterrent against a head-to-head battle. More significantly, domestic economic woes in Venezuela real GDP fell by 4.5% y-o-y in the third quarter and inflation remains rampant will hardly improve if Chávez were to divert already scarce resource towards a military conflict. As for the regional reaction to the present stand-off, it is clear that key powers such as Brazil are on stand-by to mediate between the two sides if things spiral of control. In sum, while it looks as though the situation could remain very tense for some time, we expect economic reality to eventually prevail, helping to restore at least some semblance of normalcy in bilateral relations.

Daowtc

**Economic Collapse causes war –**

**Statistics prove - empirically democracy and multilateralism die—cooperative relations become impossible—fears of resource scarcity create incentives for nuclear preemption preventing focus on other issues**

**Proves rb – low econ means won’t invest in oil sect**

**turns**

**The impact is U.S.-Russian nuclear war and collapse of the war on terror**

**Ockham Research, 8** (11/18/08, “Economic Distress and Geopolitical Risks,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/106562-economic-distress-and-geopolitical-risks, JMP)

The economic turmoil roiling world markets right now brings with it plenty of pain. Jobs are being lost, people’s savings decimated, retirement plans/goals thrown out the window, etc. Hard times bring with them harsh consequences. However, it is perhaps useful to be mindful of the geopolitical risks that accompany economic dislocation. Many analysts are eager to compare the difficulties now confronting the global economic system with those of the Great Depression. While I do not believe that the world is facing a second Great Depression, it might be worthwhile to recall from history that the Great Depression spawned geopolitical turmoil that lead to the Second World War. The incoming Obama administration—and Democratic members of Congress who talk of implementing massive defense cutbacks—may want to remember the lessons of the past as they stand on the threshold of power.

The hardship and turmoil which impacted the world during the Great Depression provided fertile ground for the rise of fascist, expansionist regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan. Hard times also precluded the Western democracies from a more muscular response in the face of growing belligerence from these countries. The United States largely turned inward during the difficult years of the 1930s. The end result was a global war of a size and scale never seen by man either before or since. Economic hardship is distracting. It can cause nations to turn their focus inward with little or no regard for rising global threats that inevitably build in tumultuous times. Authoritarian regimes invariably look for scapegoats to blame for the hardship affecting their populace. This enables them to project the anger of their citizenry away from the regime itself and onto another race, country, ideology, etc.

Looking at the world today, one can certainly envision numerous potential flashpoints that could become problematic in a protracted economic downturn. Pakistan, already a hotbed of Islamic extremism and armed with atomic weapons, has been particularly hard hit by the global economic crisis. An increasingly impoverished Pakistan will be harder and harder for its new and shaky democratically-elected government to control. Should Pakistan’s economic troubles cause its political situation—always chaotic—to spin out of control, this would be a major setback in the global war on terror.

Russia, whose economy, stock markets and financial system have literally imploded over the past few months, could become increasingly problematic if faced with a protracted economic downturn. The increasingly authoritarian and aggressive Russian regime is already showing signs of anger projection. Its invasion of Georgia this summer and increasing willingness to confront the West reflect a desire to stoke the pride and anger of its people against foreign powers—particularly the United States. It is no accident that the Russians announced a willingness to deploy tactical missile systems to Kaliningrad the day after Barack Obama’s election in the U.S. This was a clear “shot across the bow” of the new administration and demonstrates Russian willingness to pursue a much more confrontational foreign policy going forward. Furthermore, the collapse in the price of oil augers poorly for Russia’s economy. The Russian budget reputedly needs oil at $70 per barrel or higher in order to be in balance. Russian foreign currency reserves, once huge, have been depleted massively over the past few months by ham-fisted attempts to arrest the slide in both markets and the financial system. Bristling with nuclear weapons and nursing an ego still badly bruised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of superpower status, an impoverished and unstable Russia would be a dangerous thing to behold.

China too is threatened by the global economic downturn. There is no doubt that China has emerged during the past decade as a major economic power. Parts of the country have been transformed by its meteoric growth. However, in truth, only about a quarter of the nation’s billion plus inhabitants—those living in the thriving cities on the coast and in Beijing—have truly felt the impact of the economic boom. Many of these people have now seen a brutal bear market and are adjusting to economic loss and diminished future prospects. However, the vast majority of China’s population did not benefit from the economic boom and could become increasingly restive in an economic slowdown. Enough economic hardship could conceivably threaten the stability of the regime and would more than likely make China more bellicose and unpredictable in its behavior, with dangerous consequences for the U.S. and the world.

Economic hardship invariably has consequences that can dwarf the original impact of those troubles. With the U.S. already at war and facing an increasingly troubled world, it is probably not a good time to make large reductions to the defense budget. With the U.S. government carrying massively greater amounts of debt now as a result of the financial carnage of the past few months, there will be increased pressure to wring savings out of almost every element of government. However, given past experience in tough economic times, it would be wise for our new government to understand the dire need to maintain a strong national defense.

**Turns LA instability**

Dennis **Blair**, Director of National Intelligence, 2/12/**9** (CQ Congressional Testimony)

The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications. The crisis has been ongoing for over a year, and economists are divided over whether and when we could hit bottom. Some even fear that the recession could further deepen and reach the level of the Great Depression. Of course, all of us recall the dramatic political consequences wrought by the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, the instability, and high levels of violent extremism. Though we do not know its eventual scale, it already looms as the most serious global economic and financial crisis in decades. Forecasts differ significantly over the depth of the downturn. Industrialized countries are already in recession, and growth in emerging market countries, previously thought to be immune from an industrialized country financial crisis, has also faltered, and many are in recession as well. Even China and India have seen their dynamic growth engines take a hit as they grapple with falling demand for their exports and a slowdown in foreign direct and portfolio investments. Governments worldwide are initiating monetary and fiscal stimulus programs designed to stabilize and recapitalize their financial sectors, cushion the impact of stalling economic activity, and eventually jumpstart a recovery, perhaps as early as late 2009. The IMF, which recently released its revised forecast for 2009 projecting an anemic 0.5 percent increase in the global economy, warns that the risks to the global economy are on the downside. The financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging market nations over the next year, prompting additional countries to request IMF or other multilateral or bilateral support. Since September 2008, ten nations committed to new IMF programs intended to provide balance of payments support. All face the task of tackling economic problems in a less benign global economic environment. Unlike the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the globally synchronized nature of this slowdown means that countries will not be able to export their way out of this recession. Indeed, policies designed to promote domestic export industries--so-called beggar-thy- neighbor policies such as competitive currency devaluations, import tariffs, and/or export subsidies--risk unleashing a wave of destructive protectionism. Time is probably our greatest threat. The longer it takes for the recovery to begin, the greater the likelihood of serious damage to US strategic interests. Roughly a quarter of the countries in the world have already experienced low-level instability such as government changes because of the current slowdown. Europe and the former Soviet Union have experienced the bulk of the anti- state demonstrations. Although two-thirds of countries in the world have sufficient financial or other means to limit the impact for the moment, **much of Latin America**, former Soviet Union states and sub-Saharan Africa lack sufficient cash reserves, access to international aid or credit, or other coping mechanism. Statistical modeling shows that economic crises increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they persist over a one to two year period. Besides increased economic nationalism, the most likely political fallout for US interests will involve allies and friends not being able to fully meet their defense and humanitarian obligations. Potential refugee flows from the Caribbean could also impact Homeland security. The dramatic decline in oil prices--more than a two-thirds decline from the July peak of $147 per barrel--is partially a result of the market betting on a deep and perhaps protracted global recession. A serious supply crunch is possible down the road if sustained low prices lead to major cuts or delays in investment by national and international oil companies, especially high cost unconventional oil sources like oil sands. Nevertheless, lower prices benefit consumers, and declining revenues may put the squeeze on the adventurism of producers like Iran and Venezuela. The crisis presents many challenges for the United States. It started in the United States, quickly spread to other industrial economies and then, more recently, to emerging markets. The widely held perception that excesses in US financial markets and inadequate regulation were responsible has increased criticism about free market policies, which may make it difficult to achieve long-time US objectives, such as the opening of national capital markets and increasing domestic demand in Asia. It already has increased questioning of US stewardship of the global economy and the international financial structure.

**Growth and democracy are the only way to solve terrorism**

Kevin J. **Fandl**, Adjunct Law Professor - Washington College of Law, ‘**4** (19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 587)

In his final speech in the United Kingdom as President of the United States, Bill Clinton stressed: "we have seen how abject poverty accelerates conflict, how it creates recruits for terrorists and those who incite ethnic and religious hatred, [and] how it fuels a violent rejection of the economic and social order on which our future depends." 50 His words carried more significance than he could have known at that moment. 51 The terrorist networks that have come about in recent history are a significant threat to world security not only because of the suicidal methods they employ, but also because of the status of the countries [\*598] where these networks recruit new members, engage in training exercises and where the leadership seeks refuge. These countries are not equipped politically or economically to design proactive plans to uproot such organizations in their own countries, despite their expressed efforts to do so. 52 They are developing countries with weak, or no, democratic political structure with which to coordinate such efforts. They do not have the resources that European countries, for instance, have in place to take preventative measures in order to sustain peace. 53 The George W. Bush Administration indicated that it "is aware of the link between desperate economic circumstances and terrorism." 54 Yet, rather than working to develop sustainable economies capable of both directly (through increased political pressure and rule of law programs) and indirectly (through increased employment opportunities and social stability) eradicating terrorism, President Bush has chosen to dedicate significant resources to a military conquest against the elusive concept of terrorism itself. 55 Many Americans and, to a much lesser extent, other Western citizens, support the view that terrorism can be fought with tanks and [\*599] bombs. 56 They obstinately believe that military technology is capable of uncovering each potentially threatening terrorist cell and keeping the West safe. 57 This conventional method of warfare, while effective in pinpointing targets in complete darkness, will be useless in eliminating the ideology that fuels terrorism. Terrorists are non-conventional actors using non-conventional means through amorphous concepts that cannot be identified, contained, or labeled. These are actors whose most potent weapon is the communication of ideas among masses of people awaiting an opportunity for a better life. Many of us watch in excited anticipation for Osama bin Laden's capture and/or death. However, we should rest assured that whether he is still alive will have no bearing on the control that his ideas, and the ideas of those like him, have on the impoverished and desperate in the Middle East, South Asia, and perhaps beyond. No military technology will be able to destroy the prevalence and furtherance of those ideas. 58

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#### card concedes that now in a gop controlled congress Obama oil policeis are unpop

#### all energy policy drains capital

Whitman, 12

Christine Todd Whitman, CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, National Journal Experts Blog, 8/13/12, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?comments=expandall#comments

It’s clear from the debate around the merits and drawbacks of various electricity and fuel sources that energy policy can be a highly polarizing topic. In fact, it’s arguable that there is no energy option that holds a truly bipartisan appeal: Every form of energy faces pockets of dissent. This makes crafting universally accepted energy policy particularly challenging.

#### Even Non controversial energy legislation requires PC to overcome poison pill riders

Chemnick, 12

Jean Chemnick, E&E reporter, E&E Daily: Wednesday, February 1, 2012, http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2012/02/01/1

Kerry conceded that it would be difficult to pass almost anything in an election year, "but we're going to do stuff that's not controversial." Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), who with Kerry introduced comprehensive climate change legislation in the last Congress, said supporters of action on global warming remain disappointed that it failed. "But if we get some energy independence, alternative energy, energy efficiency legislation adopted, I think we will thereby also diminish carbon pollution, which I think it's all about," he said. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), who worked with Kerry and Lieberman on the climate bill but was not ultimately a co-sponsor, said that he saw opportunities for bipartisan collaboration, especially on efficiency measures. "I think there's a market now for energy efficiency and a market for domestic energy production," he said. In particular, Graham singled out his Home Star bill, which would have provided incentives for residential efficiency retrofits that he sponsored last Congress with Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.). "I think there would be bipartisan support for that," Graham added. But it is unclear whether Home Star would be a candidate for any proposed package this year. The Warner-Graham bill has not been reintroduced, and while a version passed the House in 2010, when the Democrats were in the majority, the Senate version was never approved by the Finance Committee. The bills the Energy and Natural Resources Committee has approved this Congress with bipartisan support include an industrial energy efficiency bill co-sponsored by Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio), a measure to establish a new carbon capture and sequestration program at the Energy Department and bills to promote solar energy and geothermal. Aside from the goal of producing legislation, the Tuesday group also provides an opportunity for its members to talk about climate and energy issues. Energy Secretary Steven Chu addressed the senators in November. Daniel Weiss of the Center for American Progress Action Fund said that any of the bills approved by the energy committee would have a good chance of making it to the floor of the Senate. But while Kerry and his colleagues may succeed in crafting a bill that would garner broad bipartisan support, Senate Republicans might move to attach amendments to it that would roll back U.S. EPA pollution restrictions, approve the Keystone XL pipeline or open new areas along the West Coast or in Alaska to petroleum production, Weiss said. Similar attempts are likely in the Republican-controlled House. "The challenge would be to keep poison-pill amendments off of the bill without getting it pulled," he said.

### 2nc Link Block \*\*\*

#### The plan burns up the limited leverage Obama has with congressional Republicans --- calling in a favor on the plan means he can’t go back to well on future fiscal issues. That’s Moore.

#### plan destroys obama

Mazzei, 12

Patricia, and Erika Bolstad, Miami Herald, 7/11/12, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/11/v-fullstory/2891728/republicans-attack-obama-for-chavez.html>

Mitt Romney, GOP howl over President Barack Obama’s remark about Hugo Chávez Republicans criticize President Obama for saying Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has not threatened U.S. national security. The region’s experts, however, side with Obama. Republicans, led by Mitt Romney and Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, pounced on President Barack Obama on Wednesday after he told a Miami TV anchor that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez does not pose a “serious” national security threat to the United States. Republicans wasted no time in firing up a key South Florida constituency coveted by both Romney and Obama: Cuban-American voters who hate Chávez for his close ties to the Castro regime in Cuba. “President Obama hasn’t been paying attention if he thinks that Hugo Chávez, with buddies like the regimes in Cuba, Iran, and Syria, drug cartels, arms traffickers, and extremist groups, is not a threat to the United States,” said Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami, chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs committee and co-chair of Romney’s National Hispanic Steering Committee. “I am deeply disappointed that this administration continues to bury its head in the sand about threats to U.S. security, our interests, and our allies.” Rubio said Obama “has been living under a rock” when it comes to Chávez, and said the president “continues to display an alarmingly naïve understanding of the challenges and opportunities we face in the western hemisphere.” Other Cuban-American lawmakers issued statements in the same critical vein, and Senate candidate Connie Mack, a Republican congressman from Fort Myers, tied his opponent Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., to the president’s remarks. Experts in the region, though, called Obama’s comments reasonable. Chávez is “certifiable,” with a tremendous ego fueled by the power that comes from sitting on vast oil reserves — but he’s not as dangerous as the leaders of other less friendly regimes, said Riordan Roett, the director of Latin American Studies Program at the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. The Republican criticism is “just pure electoral politics,” Roett said. “He poses no security threat to the United States or anyone else,” Roett said. “Hugo Chávez is not going to attack us, he’s not going to occupy our embassy, he’s not going to bomb U.S. planes arriving in Caracas at Maiquetía Airport. He is a loudmouth who enjoys listening to himself, and has built up on the basis of oil revenue, a very, very populist, dependent regime that can’t deliver on basic services, on goods and commodities to his own people.” Here’s what Obama told Oscar Haza, a Spanish-language broadcast journalist and anchor in an interview with Obama that aired Tuesday night on A Mano Limpia (which roughly translates to “The Gloves Are Off”), Haza’s nightly show on WJAN-Channel 41: “We’re always concerned about Iran engaging in destabilizing activity around the globe,” Obama said. “But overall my sense is that what Mr. Chávez has done over the last several years has not had a serious national security impact on us. We have to be vigilant. My main concern when it comes to Venezuela is having the Venezuelan people have a voice in their affairs, and that you end up ultimately having fair and free elections, which we don’t always see.” Romney called Obama’s comment “stunning and shocking” and said in statement it’s a sign of “a pattern of weakness” in the president’s foreign policy. “It is disturbing to see him downplaying the threat posed to U.S. interests by a regime that openly wishes us ill,” Romney said. “Hugo Chávez has provided safe haven to drug kingpins, encouraged regional terrorist organizations that threaten our allies like Colombia, has strengthened military ties with Iran and helped it evade sanctions, and has allowed a Hezbollah presence within his country’s borders.” White House press secretary Jay Carney declined to answer questions about the president’s remarks. The president’s campaign spokesman, Ben LaBolt, said Romney is only “playing into the hands of Chávez” and his “outdated rhetoric” by giving him any attention. “Because of President Obama’s leadership, our position in the Americas is much stronger today than before he took office,” LaBolt said. “At the same time, Hugo Chávez has become increasingly marginalized and his influence has waned. It’s baffling that Mitt Romney is so scared of a leader like Chávez whose power is fading, while Romney continues to remain silent about how to confront al-Qaeda or how to bring our troops home from Afghanistan.” Michael Shifter, president of the Washington D.C.-based think tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that it’s up to the president to judge in an election year whether it’s politically smart to talk about Chávez in a way that draws such heated Republican response in South Florida — especially considering how valuable the swing state’s votes are to Obama’s prospects.

#### Syria proves that if Obama had forced the GOP to side with him on that issue that they would not have on future issues like debt ceiling

Hunt, 9/8 (Albert R., 9/8/2013, “Syria Vote May Derail Obama’s Agenda in Congress,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-08/syria-vote-may-derail-obama-s-agenda-in-congress.html)>)

Congress is like a seamless web where every action has an effect on those that follow, the late Richard Bolling, a longtime member of the House and a congressional scholar, used to remind young reporters.

The Barack Obama administration will confront that reality this autumn in the aftermath of its request for congressional approval for a military strike against Syria.

The outcome remains in doubt, though there may be an even chance that after a near-death experience or two, Congress will authorize a strike in a close vote.

There is little doubt, however, that this struggle, which will occupy most of September, will affect other big issues: the high-stakes deficit and debt-ceiling battle, the fate of a comprehensive immigration bill in the House -- and perhaps in the Senate -- and the nomination of the next chairman of the Federal Reserve.

This is mostly downside for the White House. If President Obama wins on Syria, most Republicans who supported him will want to take their distance on other issues; the party’s base is dominated by Obama haters. Getting the reluctant backing of some liberal Democrats for military action might add to the tension on the fiscal issues and the Fed pick.

Common Ground

Some Obama loyalists make the case that the Syria resolution, if approved, could lead to other successes. Working across party lines might prove contagious, precipitating a search for more common ground.

“It’s too early to tell what the fallout from this vote will be on other issues,” says Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, the leading House Democrat on fiscal issues, but “there will be ripple effects.”

Others believe a Kumbaya moment just isn’t possible in the Washington of today: “If a Republican gives the president a vote on this, they’ll have to go back to the base on the fiscal stuff and maybe the Fed,” says former Republican Representative Tom Davis, an astute analyst of U.S. politics.

House Speaker John Boehner, who will probably be part of a distinct minority of his caucus in voting for the Syria measure, will be under enormous pressure to move right. “Coming right on the heels of Syria, House Republicans have to get something in return on debt,” Davis says.

The Democrats, who are counting on winning at least the public-opinion battle in the fiscal war, may find it harder to depict Republican leaders as partisan nihilists if those leaders have just bailed out the president on Syria.

Democrats are worried that after using all his chits to get barely enough votes for the strike resolution, Obama -- whose negotiating skills are suspect to many on Capitol Hill -- might then be too eager to cut a fiscal deal.

Especially worrisome would be if Republicans demanded, as the price for Syria, a rollback of the cuts to defense spending under sequestration. Liberals are adamant that any changes to the automatic reductions must apply equally to domestic and military programs.

#### This is particularly true for Boehner’s political capital --- getting him to bend once will deplete his leverage to reign in the base on debt ceiling demands. This will crush the economy.

TPM, 9/6 (Talking Points Memo, “Could Syria Lead To Fiscal Armageddon Back Home?” 9/6/2013, Lexis))

In the less favorable scenario, the Syria debate drags on, and complicates the politics of averting fiscal disaster. House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) is supporting Obama's call for action in Syria, but many if not most Republicans are currently skeptical or opposed. In the toxic climate of internal GOP politics, it's perilous to be on the same side of an issue as Obama. In particular, if most Republicans end up voting no on Syria in defiance of the House leadership, it could chip away at Boehner's limited political capital with his House conference. He already faces the unenviable task[2] of talking his members down from their unrealistically high demands for unwinding Obamacare and cutting entitlement spending as a price for lifting the debt ceiling.

If things play out this way, Boehner may face greater pressure to engage in the sort of brinkmanship that brought the U.S. government within hours of default in the summer of 2011. The Speaker doesn't want to let that happen and his last resort would be to avoid it without the buy-in of most House Republicans. The likely upheaval would not only imperil his job, it could send chills through the economy.

#### No impact to oil shocks

Taylor 7 – Cato fellow (Jerry and Peter Van Doren, 9/28, Be Not Afraid, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8726, AG)

That was the state of the debate until the most recent price shock. The economy's failure to respond to one of the steepest oil price increases in history with a recession, however, sent economists back to the theoretical drawing board. Several important papers appeared in 2006, which reexamine the role of oil shocks in the macroeconomy. A common theme of those papers is that policy-imposed rigidities in the economy were responsible for the bad economic outcomes associated with past oil price shocks. An analysis by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta demonstrated that oil shocks had significant effects on the macroeconomy before 1985 but not after. The authors argued that the federal price control regime of the 1970s was the true cause of the recessions that decade. Economist David Walton at the Bank of England likewise argued that wage rigidities in the 1970s were the culprit responsible for that dismal decade. And economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland offered evidence that oil price increases never have and never will cause inflation. They calculated that a doubling of oil prices would lead to a one-time increase in commodity prices of about 3-percent. All the new analyses agree that the more flexible economy that we have now, allows us to cope more easily with oil price shocks.

#### ) Squo solves – market pressures

**González and Vyas, 13** (4/4/2013, Angel González and Kejal Vyas, “Unlocking Venezuela’s vast energy potential; Revival of the country’s oil sector post-Chávez on standby,” <http://www.businesswithoutborders.com/topics/opportunities/unlocking-venezuelas-vast-energy-potential/>, JMP)

But **declining oil output and rising shale-oil production in the U.S., Venezuela’s main market, may force a redirection.** Barring any new political or military shocks in the Middle East, **global oil prices look like “a balloon with a slow leak**,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, executive director for energy and sustainability at the University of California-Davis. The Venezuelan government can’t count on high oil prices to match rising public spending, she added. Anticapitalist rhetoric heated up in the days leading to Mr. Chávez’s death. Venezuelan Acting President Nicolás Maduro accused Chevron Corp., the No. 2 U.S. oil company by market value behind Exxon, of aggression against Ecuador in a multibillion-dollar environmental lawsuit pitting the company against Ecuadorean plaintiffs. Analysts said they were surprised by the comments, as Chevron, the only major U.S. oil company to remain in Venezuela, was considered by Mr. Chávez as a key investor, and is lending Venezuela $2 billion to increase output at a joint-venture oil development. A spokesman for Chevron declined to comment on Mr. Maduro’s assertion. Despite the posturing, Mr. Chávez’s death presents an opportunity for a new administration to lift some of the burdens heaped on PDVSA, which has supplied billions of dollars in cheap oil to Cuba and other friendly foreign governments, said Carlos Jordá, a Houston-based oil consultant who was once a senior manager at the oil company. To reach its full potential, Venezuela´s entire oil industry sector needs to be reinvented, something that is unlikely, said Luis Pacheco, a former PDVSA executive fired during the oil strike of 2003 along with 20,000 other employees who opposed Mr. Chávez. In 2000, Mr. Chávez signed its first oil deal with Cuba, providing the communist island with 53,000 barrels a day of cut-rate oil, a sum that has risen to 110,000 barrels now. In return, the Cuban government has sent some 40,000 doctors and experts to support the popular social programs developed by Mr. Chávez. Mr. Jordá, who called those oil deals unsustainable, said that domestic fuel prices, the world’s lowest at around 6 cents a gallon, will also have to rise at some point. The cost to the country of the domestic fuel subsidies has also increased because refinery accidents forced the government to import growing quantities of gasoline, according to the EIA. The Venezuelan government denies it imports fuel. **Worsening fiscal conditions will** also **prompt** Mr. **Chávez’s successors to improve relations with foreign investors—and eliminate bottlenecks** created by the deceased leader’s highly-personal, hands-on management style, **said** Jim **Loftis, a partner with Vinson & Elkins LLC’s international arbitration practice**. **The country also needs to increase oil production to pay for tens of billions of dollars in Chinese loans** it undertook to finance large social projects and a big boost in election spending last year. “Venezuelans see their relationship with oil as if the nation’s virility is at stake,” Mr. Pacheco said. Until that perception changes, the oil industry will “keep dancing in a circle around the fire, waiting for it to rain.”

### AT: Fiat Solves the Link

**Fiat doesn’t solve the link—the plan passes through the least necessary means which still links to the disadvantage—Post-fiat backlash kills political capital**

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**Politics DA’s are good—politics is the reason these affirmatives haven’t been done, which proves they teach poor advocacy skills. It’s key to neg ground—politics is this year’s topic disad—all others lack link uniqueness. It’s also key to educational innovation and civic engagement which are portable skills outside debate**

### 2nc Trade Off / Political Capital Key

#### Debt will narrowly pass—Obama’s leverage is key

Kapur, 9/9 --- TPM’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent

(9/9/2013, Sahil, “Is House GOP Backing Down In Debt Limit Fight?” <http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/house-gop-cantor-memo-debt-ceiling-cr-sequester-immigration.php>)

#### Obama’s capital is key to raise debt ceiling

Bull & Younglai, 9/5 (Alister Bull and Rachelle Younglai, 9/5/2013, “Analysis: Battle over Fed - Summers' opponents seek to sway Obama,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-usa-fed-summers-analysis-idUSBRE98414R20130905)>)

Still, some Washington veterans are perplexed that Obama is apparently willing to bypass Yellen, who is also viewed as well qualified, and are concerned that Obama risks an unnecessary congressional fight at a time when he could spend his political capital more wisely.

As well as battling for authorization to punish the use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the White House must currently also persuade lawmakers to raise the U.S. debt ceiling and forge an agreement to fund the federal government for the fiscal year beginning in October.

"Does Barack Obama want to play political football with the Congress on everything all fall?" asked David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official who is now president of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm.

#### ( ) Syria proves our link --- a fight on another issue like it would have sucked capital away from debt ceiling

Frenzel, 9/6 --- Guest Scholar in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution (9/6/2013, Bill, “By Dropping Syria In Congress' Lap, Obama Creates The Worst Of The Bad Old Days,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrenzel/2013/09/06/by-dropping-syria-in-congress-lap-obama-creates-the-worst-of-the-bad-old-days/)>)

Unfortunately, there is much more to this vote than a President forcing the Congress to ratify his decision. The Syria question is also consuming the President’s political capital at a time when he may be running a bit short anyway. He’s not a lame duck yet, but in a year he will be. Capital spent on Syria is capital not available for looming domestic problems.

Worse, the decision comes at a time when Congressional energies ought to be focused on the FY14 CR, the sequester repair, and the Debt Ceiling extension. Congress is already a polarized battleground. Syria, because it is different, may relieve tensions. More likely, it will crank up animosities and resentments between parties, branches and houses. Surely, it will burn valuable negotiating time.

Syria is an important foreign policy/national security issue. But it’s a mouse compared to the elephantine domestic fiscal problem. It now seems probable that the Syria vote may delay and confuse settlement of the budget question, and exacerbate existing budget tensions.

If those conditions lead to a smaller budget agreement, and another year or two of kicking that same old can down the road, those unintended consequences would dwarf whatever happens in Syria as a result of well-intentioned U.S. anti-poison-gas efforts.

### 2NC UQ (Also Syria Answers)

#### Card not specific to debt ceiling

#### Debt will narrowly be resolved—that’s Kapur

**A) Signaling—republicans are caving to demands—Obama’s signal is key**

**B) Empirics—Obama made a debt deal in January only because he had credibility—prefer empirics over fear mongering**

#### Card not specific to debt ceiling

**C)** **Shifting focus—moving away from Syria ensures pressure on debt—prefer comparative evidence on competing legislation**

Bohan, 9/11 (Caren, 9/11/2013, “Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-obama-agenda-idUSL2N0H716N20130911>))

WASHINGTON, Sept 11 (Reuters) - Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.

Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.

But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.

The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.

But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.

"He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.

Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.

He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration's "full court press" to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success.

"He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that's a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation," Pitney said.

BUDGET BATTLES

Among Obama's most immediate challenges are two looming budget fights. By Sept. 30, Congress and the president must agree on legislation to keep federal agencies funded or face a government shutdown.

Two weeks later, Congress must raise the limit on the country's ability to borrow or risk a possible debt default that could cause chaos in financial markets.

On the first budget showdown, Obama may be at a strategic advantage because of divisions among opposition Republicans about whether to use the spending bill to provoke a fight over Obama's signature health care law, known as Obamacare.

House Republican leaders are trying to rally the party around a temporary spending measure that would keep the government funded until Dec. 15 but are facing resistance within their own caucus from some conservatives who want to cut off funding for Obamacare, even if it means a government shutdown.

The debt limit fight could end up going down to the wire and unnerving financial markets. Republicans want to use that standoff to extract concessions from the Democratic president, such as spending cuts and a delay in the health law. But Obama has said he has no intention of negotiating over the borrowing limit.

Another challenge for Obama will be reviving momentum for immigration reform. Sweeping legislation that would grant a path to citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants has passed the Democratic-led Senate but has been stalled in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives.

Over the past week and half, lobbyists and other supporters of immigration reform have become worried that the Syria issue could doom the legislation in the House by limiting the amount of time lawmakers have to consider it.

But lobbyists are not ready to give up and have continued meeting with lawmakers to press the issue.

Some activists believe Obama could create pressure on Republicans to act by making greater use of the bully pulpit. The White House has sought to strike a balance between calling for action and giving Congress space to consider the issue.

Another pressing domestic matter will be picking a candidate to succeed Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, whose term expires in January. Obama has been leaning toward Lawrence Summers, a former top White House aide and Treasury secretary, who is controversial within his own Democratic Party.

Any candidate for Fed chairman will require confirmation by the U.S. Senate.

On issues like the budget battles in which Obama will go toe-to-toe with Republicans, the Syria push will have little fallout for Obama, predicted Matt Bennett, senior vice president at Third Way, a center-left think tank.

Republicans showed a huge resistance to Obama's agenda well before the administration's effort to win congressional backing on Syria began to falter, Bennett noted. He said the time focused on Syria over the last week and half did nothing to change that dynamic.

"I certainly don't think the situation he's in today is markedly different from the one he faced a

few weeks ago," Bennett said.

#### D) Prefer evidence from White House Officials

Khunhenn, 9/8 (Jim, The Associated Press, “Issues test Obama's persuasion, mobilizing skills,” Lexis))

The tasks stacking up before President Barack Obama over the coming weeks will test his persuasion powers and his mobilizing skills more than any other time in his presidency.

How well Obama handles the challenges in the concentrated amount of time before him could determine whether he leads the nation from a position of strength or whether he becomes a lame duck one year into his second term.

Between now and the end of October, Obama must convince wary lawmakers that they should grant him authority to take military action against Syria; take on Congress in an economy-rattling debate over spending and the nation's borrowing limit; and oversee a crucial step in the putting in place his prized health care law.

The Syria vote looms as his first, biggest and perhaps most defining challenge. His mission is persuading Congress and bringing the public along to approve armed action against the Syrian government in response to a chemical attack that Obama blames on President Bashar Assad's government.

"It's conceivable that, at the end of the day, I don't persuade a majority of the American people that it's the right thing to do," Obama acknowledged in a news conference Friday.

His chief of staff, Denis McDonough, was asked on "Fox News Sunday" whether a congressional rejection might endanger Obama's presidency, and he responded: "Politics is somebody else's concern. The president is not interested in the politics of this."

Presidents tend to have an advantage on issues of national security, a tradition demonstrated by the support Obama has won for action in Syria from the bipartisan leadership of the House. But that has not translated so far into firm support among the rank and file.

"Congress can look presidents in the eye on a level gaze regarding the budget," the presidential historian H.W. Brands said. "But on war and peace they have to look up to the president, he's the commander in chief.

"If he does lose, even if the loss comes about partly as a result from negative Democratic votes, the Republicans are going to get the bit in their teeth and say `We're not going to give this guy anything,'" said Brands, a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, said.

By that reasoning, success on Syria could give Obama some momentum.

"If he gets the authority it shows that he's not a lame duck, that he still has some power," said John Feehery, a Republican strategist and former House GOP leadership aide. "If he doesn't get the authority, it's devastating. People see him as the lamest of lame ducks."

The Syria vote, however, is unusual and probably will not break along traditional partisan or ideological lines. Democrats and Republicans have voiced support and opposition to a military intervention. As a result, some White House officials believe their ability to influence issues that split along party lines is limited.

"It becomes more of a stand-alone," said Republican pollster David Winston, who advises House Republican leaders. "This is a decision distinct from internal domestic politics."

At the White House, Syria for now has eclipsed all other matters.

Obama spent the last two days in St. Petersburg, Russia, trying to build a coalition of support from among the members of the Group of 20 largest economies. Back home, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry made their case to lawmakers in public and in private while Obama lobbied individual members by telephone.

On Tuesday, Obama will speak to the nation during an evening address from the White House, a rare forum reserved for the weightiest of issues. The speech will come a day before the Senate holds its first showdown vote over a resolution authorizing the "limited and specified use" of U.S. armed forces against Syria. The resolution bars the use of U.S. combat troops. A final Senate vote could come at the end of the week. The House would likely take the measure up the following week.

Win or lose, Obama and lawmakers then would run headlong into a debate over the budget.

Congress will have a limited window to continue government operations before the new budget year begins Oct. 1.

Congressional leaders probably will agree to hold spending at current budget levels for about two months or three months. That would delay a confrontation with the White House and pair a debate over 2014 spending levels with the government's need to raise its current $16.7 trillion borrowing limit. The Treasury says the government will hit that ceiling in mid-October.

Obama has been adamant that he will not negotiate over the debt limit. He says a similar faceoff in 2011 hurt the economy and caused Standard & Poors to lower its rating of the nation's debt, which made it more expensive to borrow.

White House officials say they ultimately have leverage because they believe Republicans would be punished politically for playing brinkmanship and threatening the nation with a default.

The White House is counting on pressure from traditional Republican allies, particularly in the business sector. "It is insane not to raise the debt ceiling," U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Thomas Donohue said last week on C-SPAN. Donohue pledged to find primary challengers against lawmakers who threaten a default.

#### E) Firm stance

AP, 9/10 (“US could default on its debt obligations by mid-October, thinktank warns,” 9/10/2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/sep/10/us-default-debt-obligations-october-thinktank>))

The United States could default on its obligations as early as October 18 if Washington fails to agree on legislation to raise the government's borrowing cap, a new study predicted Tuesday.

The Bipartisan Policy Center analysis says the default date would come no later than November 5, and that the government would quickly fall behind on its payments, including social security benefits and military pensions.

The thinktank's estimate is in line with a warning last month by Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew that the government would exhaust its borrowing authority by mid-October and be left with just $50bn cash on hand.

The government has never defaulted on its obligations. Raising the $16.7tn borrowing cap promises to be a major struggle for House Republicans and President Obama.

Two years ago Obama agreed to pair a $2.1tn increase in the debt limit with an equivalent amount in spending cuts spread over 10 years. But the president now says that he won't negotiate over the debt limit and is asking Congress to send him a straightforward increase that would ensure the government can pay its bills.

In January, House Republicans permitted an increase in the debt ceiling without demanding offsetting spending cuts.

#### The issue of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ has already been priced in to Obama’s political calculations but the plan hasn’t --- making it a unique link.

#### Economic issues are now Obama’s top priority

Sink, 9/12 (Justin, “Obama signals shift back to economic focus,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/economy/321793-obama-signals-shift-back-to-focus-on-the-economy>))

The White House is signaling it wants to shift back to the economy after two weeks in which the Syrian crisis has dominated President Obama’s schedule and workload.

Obama will be “focusing” on issues related to the economy in the coming weeks, White House press secretary Jay Carney said Wednesday at his daily briefing.

He said the president wants to push forward with economic policies that the White House believes will grow the middle class.

Obama himself in his prime-time address to the nation Tuesday on Syria said voters wanted him focused on the economy and not on Syria. Public support for a military intervention in Syria is low.

“I know Americans want all of us in Washington — especially me — to concentrate on the task of building our nation here at home: putting people back to work, educating our kids, growing our middle class,” Obama said.

The president had wanted to use the beginning of September to press forward on his economic policies ahead of fights with Congress on government spending and debt.

Lawmakers must agree on a continuing resolution to fund the federal government by the end of September, which also marks the end of the fiscal year. If they fail to do so, the government would shut down, except for essential services.

The nation is also rapidly approaching the drop-dead date for hitting the debt ceiling, which restricts Washington’s ability to loan money and cover its payment obligations. An analysis released Tuesday by the Bipartisan Policy Center estimated the country would hit the debt ceiling sometime between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5.

Obama had hoped to enter those battles with momentum from a mid-August campaign-style tour that included a college bus trip through the Northeast, a visit to an Amazon shipping facility in Tennessee and a discussion of mortgage reform in Arizona.

The president had planned to continue that push this week, but that plan was knocked aside by the alleged use of chemical weapons by Syria’s government on Aug. 21.

Obama’s scheduled travel to Los Angeles, where he was slated to speak before union members at the AFL-CIO convention, was canceled so he could make his case for military strikes on Syria.

Vice President Biden pressed the administration’s economic message with a Monday trip to Baltimore that highlighted a new $10 million federal grant to widen the city’s port and better connect the shipping center to nearby rail lines.

But that trip was overshadowed by a dinner he hosted the previous night at the Naval Observatory, where he and Obama lobbied a group of Republican senators to back air strikes against Syria.

Carney acknowledged Wednesday that “there is no question that Syria has consumed a lot of attention here in Washington, around the country, around the world.”

But the White House spokesman refused to make a “political assessment” about whether the situation in Syria had affected Obama’s domestic policy hand.

The administration and its allies seem ready to return to the economy.

On Monday, Organizing for Action, the political advocacy group born from the president’s reelection campaign, asked supporters to sign a petition demanding that Congress avert a government shutdown.

Rep. Gene Green (D-Texas) emerged Tuesday from a Syria briefing with White House chief of staff Denis McDonough predicting that Congress would now “go back to our typical things, like the debt limit,” according to Reuters.

Indeed, attention on Capitol Hill seemed to have already shifted to the looming budget battle on Wednesday. House Republican leaders announced they would delay a vote on a continuing resolution that would have kept the government funded through Dec. 15, a move that highlighted the danger of a shutdown.

GOP leaders are struggling to win support for their plan to keep the government funded at current levels while forcing the Senate to vote on a measure defunding ObamaCare.

#### Debt ceiling resolution is top of the docket

Hispanic Business, 9/3 (“Lew Calls on Congress to Raise Debt Ceiling,” 9/3/2013, <http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/2013/9/3/lew_calls_on_congress_to_raise.htm>))

U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew told Congress the government will run out of money to pay its bills in mid-October unless lawmakers raise the country's borrowing limit, which is capped at $16.7 trillion.

Lew said in a letter to Speaker of the House John Boehner that the government is running out of accounting maneuvers it has used to avoid hitting the borrowing limit. He pressed Congress to act so Treasury can keep paying the government's bills.

Lew said it's impossible for Treasury to predict exactly when the borrowing limit will be reached. But he warns that if action isn't taken soon, the government could be left with $50 billion in cash by mid-October. He says that wouldn't be enough to cover Social Security payments, military personnel salaries, Medicare and other programs for an "extended period."

Lew told CNBC in a Tuesday morning interview that there cannot be any question that the United States is a country that pays its bills.

Earlier this year, Congress temporarily suspended the borrowing limit so lawmakers could focus on other budget debates. Treasury has kept the government operating for several months through its bookkeeping maneuvers. A smaller deficit this year has also helped.

The government is spending more than it takes in, running up annual deficits in excess of $1 trillion in each of the past four budget years. It has been borrowing the difference to meet its obligations.

Republicans want to reduce future deficits by cutting back sharply on spending.

Democrats have proposed a mix of spending cuts and tax increases, which Republicans strongly oppose. The issue awaits resolution when lawmakers return from the recess.

Congress last passed legislation to increase the borrowing limit in the summer of 2011 after a monthslong negotiation between President Barack Obama and top lawmakers like Boehner.

Republicans forced Obama to accept about $2 trillion in spending cuts over the coming decade in exchange for a like-sized increase in the borrowing limit.

Obama says he won't negotiate on the debt limit this time around and says Congress should fund the spending it has previously approved.

Many Republicans want to use upcoming budget deadlines to mount an assault on Obama's health care law. Top House Republicans could use the borrowing limit measure as a way to derail "Obamacare," though the White House and top Senate Democrats say that's a nonstarter.

Lew told CNBC the administration would not accept a delay or defunding of parts of the law, which aims to help millions of uninsured people gain health insurance coverage.

### 2NC Intrinsicness

**Counterinterp–judge is a citizen**

**It is intrinsic—the government isn’t a monolith—link proves policymakers take political considerations into account**

**Intrinsicness is a voting issue – neg ground – they can solve all disads – forces impact turn debates that kill specific research**